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This dissertation is made up of three essays that examine racial and gender differ-
entials in labor and housing markets.
The first essay uses unique data on local television news to examine how firms may
compete via employee differentiation in response to customer prejudice. The results
indicate that there is a negative correlation between the racial, gender, and age
composition of competing stations. Moreover, the ratings data suggest that the
stations with relatively few blacks on-air are catering to the more discriminatory
customers. While a similar result is found for age and gender, the reverse holds for
other groups, suggesting possible tastes for diversity for Hispanics and Asians. Taken
as a whole, the evidence supports a new theoretical model in which firms differentiate
vi
via the characteristics of their employees in response to customer prejudice.
The second essay disentagles the relationship between race, neighborhood charac-
teristics, and housing prices. Because race and neighborhood characteristics are
strongly correlated, studies of racial housing price differentials have yielded results
that vary widely depending on the types of neighborhood controls used. This pa-
per shows that even with relatively thorough neighborhood controls, there is still
evidence that correlation between the error term and regressors is a source of bias.
While recent studies have tended to find evidence of a negative premium for blacks,
fixed effects estimates in this paper indicate that black owners pay premiums of
around 10 percent for housing. Moreover, house values decline in neighborhoods as
the percentage of blacks increases, suggesting prejudicial attitudes.
The third essay examines the labor market effects of Proposition 209, which ended
state affirmative action programs in California. I use Current Population Survey
(CPS) data and triple difference techniques to take advantage of the natural exper-
iment presented by this change in state law to gauge the labor market impacts of
ending affirmative action programs. There appears to have been little change in the
relative unemployment rates of women and minorities, but labor force participation
declined sharply. This decline suggests that either affirmative action programs in






List of Tables x
List of Figures xii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Labor Market Discrimination as a Competitive Device 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Local television news data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Theoretical model of racial differentiation in response to customer
discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Analysis of Station Composition and Customer Preferences . . . . . 20
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chapter 3 Understanding Racial Differentials in U.S. Housing Prices 36
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Theoretical Models of Racial Housing Price Differentials . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Previous Empirical Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
viii
3.5 Econometric Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 Estimates and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Chapter 4 A Cure for Discrimination? Affirmative Action and the
Case of Proposition 209 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 The history and consequences of affirmative action policy . . . . . . 69
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.4 Econometric model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 Empirical analysis of Proposition 209 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Chapter 5 Conclusion 92
Appendix A 96
A.1 Variables Used in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.2 Properties of the Racial Composition Estimator in Chapter 2 . . . . 100
A.3 Variables Used in Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102





2.1 Average Ratings and Shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Average Characteristics of On-Air Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Proportion of Shows with a Minority Anchor . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Tests of Within-DMA Station Differences . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Random Effects Racial Composition Regressions . . . . . . . 23
2.6 EEO Enforcement Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7 Impact of DMA Composition on Minority Hiring over Time 28
2.8 Fixed Effects Ratings Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 House, Neighborhood, and Household Characteristics by
Race of Respondent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Racial and Neighborhood Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Within Changes in Racial Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Select Random Effects Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5 Select Fixed Effects Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1 Sample Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Change in Non-Participation: White Males and Females . . 77
4.3 Triple Differences Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4 Triple differences for proportion of each group that left the
labor force conditional on a change in participation . . . . . 80
x
4.5 Triple Difference Coefficients for Employment, Unemploy-
ment, and Non-Participation LPMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.6 Triple Difference Coefficients for Log(Wage) Regressions . . 86
4.7 Non-Participation DDD Coefficients by Education and Age
(1995-1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.8 DDD Coefficients for Sector of Employment (1995-1999) . . 89
A.1 Variables Used in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.2 Variables Used in Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.3 1995-1999 Difference Coefficients From Chapter 4 . . . . . . 104
xi
List of Figures
2.1 Effects of Employee Compositions on Ratings . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 Example of Racial Price Gradient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54




Nearly fifty years after the peak of the Civil Rights movement, inequality persists
in American society. On average, women earn twenty-one percent less than men.
Blacks are twice as likely to be unemployed as whites and are half as likely to be
college graduates. Asians are twenty-five percent less likely than whites to be home
owners. Hispanics are three times more likely to be living below the poverty line and
three times more likely to lack health insurance than non-Hispanic whites. In the
2000 elections, the voting rate for eligible minorities was seventy-eight percent that
of whites. Blacks are five times more likely to be incarcerated than whites. Even
in death we do not escape inequality: black infant death rates are more than twice
those of whites and black men live an average of six years less than white men.1
Observations of racial and gender differentials, however, are not tantamount to
evidence of discrimination. If we wish to craft effective policy for closing these gaps,
or if we want to figure out whether they should or can be closed at all, we need
to understand their source. We need to ask difficult questions about fundamental
differences in innate ability, preferences, and opportunity. We need to figure out
1Employment, wage, and education statistics were calculated by the author using 2003 Current
Population Survey (CPS) microdata. Home ownership statistics are from United States Census
Bureau (2004). Voting data are from Jamieson et al. (2002). Incarceration rates are from Harrison
and Karberg (2004). Poverty and health insurance information are based on DeNavas-Walt et al.
(2004). Mortality figures are from National Center for Health Statistics (2004).
1
how all three interact. Women, for instance, might earn less than men because of
labor market discrimination. However, they also might earn less than men because
they are fundamentally less skilled, are less attached to the work force due to child
bearing, or because they tend to enter lower-paying occupations. But then, women
could enter lower paying occupations as a result of inequality in upbringing or edu-
cation. In short, we need to untangle the web of preference, opportunity, prejudice,
and discrimination to understand how differentials are created. Is it the playing
field that is not level, or is it the entrants?
This dissertation is composed of three essays that look at that proverbial playing
field by measuring how differentials in labor and housing markets are influenced by
prejudice, by direct discriminatory action, and by government policy.
The first chapter uses unique data on local television news to demonstrate that
firms strategically alter their racial composition in response to customer preferences.
Previously, only the impact that customer preferences might have on labor market
outcomes has been considered, without taking into account the potential for product
differentiation in response to these preferences. This chapter provides both theory
and evidence to show that competing local news stations appear to differentiate
through the characteristics of their on-air staff in order to capture certain groups of
customers.
The second chapter examines how racial differentials in housing markets are
influenced by neighborhood characteristics, demander prejudice, and supplier dis-
crimination. It shows that previous studies have yielded estimates that were bi-
ased downward because of incomplete neighborhood controls. Holding neighborhood
characteristics fixed, black homeowners tend to pay more for identical housing than
white homeowners but, at the same time, house prices fall as the black composi-
tion of a neighborhood rises, suggesting that both demander prejudice and supplier
discrimination play a role in housing markets.
The final chapter examines the impact of California Proposition 209, which re-
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moved state-sponsored affirmative action in 1997. Using triple difference techniques,
it provides evidence that female and minority employment fell sharply as these
groups left the labor force with the removal of affirmative action. The finding of
a decline in participation for affected groups suggests that either government pol-
icy was inefficient or that it was ineffective in engendering permanent change in
preferences.
Each essay asks an important question about how both prejudicial attitudes and
direct discrimination can affect differentials and how to separate the two. After all,
if we are to craft policy to try to shrink the gaps in our society, we need to know
whether it is sufficient to simply outlaw direct discrimination or whether we need
to worry about the source.
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Chapter 2
Labor Market Discrimination as
a Competitive Device
2.1 Introduction
Local television news does not seem to fit the mold that we economists have cast for
customer discrimination. As Becker (1957) first demonstrated, the racial preferences
of customers can directly affect the marginal revenue product of labor of different
groups and, hence, labor market outcomes. But if, as several recent papers have
suggested (e.g., Kanazawa and Funk, 2001; Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1998; Burdekin
and Idson, 1991; Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; Kahn and Sherer, 1988), consumers
prefer not to interact with minority employees, then why do we see so many blacks,
Asians, and Hispanics on the local news? In 2002 an average of 21 percent of broad-
cast news employees at local television stations were minorities versus 12 percent
of newspaper journalists and 8 percent of radio broadcast employees (Papper, 2003;
American Society of Newspaper Editors, 2003). Given the frequent supposition of
prejudice against minorities, it seems strange, at first glance, that minorities have
greater representation in the more visible media. Might it be the case that cus-
tomers actually have a preference for diversity in some circumstances? Or are other
4
factors at play here?
Casual observations of diversity are not the only source of interest in the market
for local television news. Identifying the presence and extent of customer discrimi-
nation is not an easy task; it requires either directly or indirectly finding a way to
measure the preferences of different labor market agents and how these attitudes
affect labor market outcomes. As a result, most studies of customer discrimination
have focused on professional sports, where worker output and customer demand are
easily observable. The evidence from these studies has varied considerably with the
particular sport, time period, and type of position examined. Gwartney and Ha-
worth (1974) find that black players increased attendance at baseball games in the
1950s; Sommers and Quinton (1982) find that blacks had an insignificant effect on
baseball team revenue in the 1970s; and Nardinelli and Simon (1990) find that base-
ball cards picturing minority players sell for less than those of white players. Studies
of basketball have tended to find evidence of discrimination (e.g., Kahn and Sherer,
1988; Burdekin and Idson, 1991; Kanazawa and Funk, 2001) with the exception of
trading cards for players from the 1970s (Stone and Warren, 1999). Looking at
football quarterbacks, Arcidiacono et al. (2004) find evidence of customer tastes for
diversity. The disparities in the empirical literature could indicate that the degree
and magnitude of customer discrimination is affected by the visibility of employ-
ees and the racial composition of customers and/or employees. Recent studies of
markets in which a large percentage of employees are black tend to find evidence of
discrimination, while studies in which blacks are not as prevalent or not as visible
are less likely to find evidence of discrimination.
While they have provided a great deal of empirical evidence, sports markets
may have more than their share of idiosyncracies. Most markets have no more
than one team in any one sport, precluding analysis of the relationship between
the characteristics of firms within a market. Moreover, the consumers of sports
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are predominantly male and may not be representative of consumers in general.1
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998) avoid this problem by using special survey data for
businesses in four US cities to match customer characteristics with labor market
outcomes. However, their conclusions are based on estimates made by the owners
of firms about the characteristics of their customer base rather than on a direct
indicator of customer preferences.
Television news presents another window into customer discrimination, both be-
cause employees are visible to customers and because it offers a measure of customer
preferences through television ratings. In this paper, I use a combination of Nielsen
ratings for November 2003 broadcasts of local television news in 25 U.S. cities and
data on the demographic characteristics of on-air personalities. Because there is ev-
idence of sorting among stations within a market, with some having a much larger
number of minorities on their newscasts than others, I present a theory demonstrat-
ing that customer discrimination can cause intra-market segregation in which firms
select their racial compositions to cater to certain groups of customers. Then, turn-
ing to the empirical evidence, I examine how the characteristics of station employees
are related to the composition of competing stations as well as of the market in which
it is located, and whether the relationships vary with changes in laws governing the
employment of minorities in broadcast news. Also, using fixed effects estimators, I
examine how the racial make-up of a station’s on-air staff affects ratings in order
to identify and measure customer preferences for different characteristics including
not only race and ethnicity, but also sex and age.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
data. Section 3 presents a theoretical model that demonstrates how customer pref-
erences can lead to intra-market segregation. Section 4 presents the econometric
1ESPN, for instance, reports that while 45 percent of TV viewers are male, 77 percent of its
viewers are (2004). Direct comparison to local television news viewers is difficult because these
audience profiles are not made readily available. However, a Pew Research Center survey found
that 61 percent of female respondents and 56 percent of male respondents report regularly watching
local television news, suggesting a more balanced audience (2004) .
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model and describes the results. I conclude in Section 5 with a summary of the
findings.
2.2 Local television news data
The data used in this study are a combination of local ratings and market de-
mographics furnished by Nielsen Media Research and station and broadcast data
compiled from a variety of sources. The data can be broken down into three basic
groups: ratings data, biographical data, and station data.
Ratings Data
The ratings data are collected by Nielsen using electronic meters that measure
whether a household is tuned in to a particular program minute-by-minute. Nielsen
aggregates the data to calculate the average per-minute audience for a show which,
in turn, is used to calculate a program’s rating and share. The rating measures
the ratio of the average number of households viewing a program to the number of
households that have television sets (the potential audience). The share measures
the ratio of the number of households viewing a program to the number of house-
holds viewing television at that time. The ratings data used in this paper were
compiled by Nielsen for the 25 largest “Designated Market Areas” (DMAs) in the
United States.2 They measure the average audience over the month of November
2003 for the different daily local television news broadcasts on FOX, CBS, ABC, and
NBC affiliates in each of the 25 DMAs. Ratings data are used for original newscasts
between 5 a.m. and 12 a.m. local time. Table 2.1 reports average ratings and shares
for local newscasts in the sample by time of day and part of week. News broadcasts
that begin in the late evening are the most popular, with an average of 8 percent of
2The 25 markets in the data, in order of size, are New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadel-
phia, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, Boston, Dallas, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Detroit, Hous-
ton, Seattle-Tacoma, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Phoenix, Cleveland-Akron,
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Denver, Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto, Orlando-Daytona Beach-Melbourn,
St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Portland, OR, and Indianapolis.
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Table 2.1: Average Ratings and Shares
Weekdays Weekends
Local Start Time Rating Share Rating Share
5:00 a.m. –7:59 a.m. 2.9 13.0 3.5 12.7
8:00 a.m. –10:59 a.m. 2.5 8.9 4.3 11.3
11:00 a.m.–4:59 p.m. 4.2 12.7 3.9 9.9
5:00 p.m. –8:59 p.m. 6.4 12.0 5.5 9.8
9:00 p.m. –11:59 p.m. 7.9 13.9 6.7 12.3
T.V. households and 14 percent of households that are watching television watching
a particular news program at this time. These averages are for one time of day
and one station alone, and most cities have at least 4 stations broadcasting local
news in English. Taken together, the ratings suggest that a large portion of the
population watches local television news broadcasts, an observation corroborated
by a Pew Research Center survey in which 59 percent of respondents reported “reg-
ularly” watching and an additional 23 percent reported “sometimes” watching local
news (2004).3
Biographical Data
To accompany the ratings data, I collected information from the biographies and pic-
tures of news teams that nearly every station makes available online and augmented
this with information from newspaper reports, news broadcasts, press releases, and
other sources of data on news staff. Using these sources, I made detailed notes on
the characteristics of each of the thousands of on-air employees in the sample of
stations. On-air jobs were divided into 4 categories: news anchor, sports anchor,
weather anchor, and reporter. Each person’s occupation was noted and the days
and times at which the anchors regularly appear were also collected. Station em-
ployees sometimes have more than one of these job titles. Most commonly, a news
anchor for one newscast may also be a general assignment reporter for others or
3The study showed no large difference in local news viewing habits by income, education levels,
or sex. However, older respondents did report watching the news more regularly than younger
respondents and blacks reported watching more regularly than other racial groups.
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a sports anchor might also be a sports reporter. In these cases, both titles were
noted although the more senior position alone is coded for the purposes of summary
statistics.
In addition to position, data were also collected on other characteristics of the
on-air staff. If available, information was collected on origin (state native or not),
first year at the station, first year of paid employment in television news, total
number of stations an employee has worked for, approximate age range (20–29, 30–
39, etc.), and highest degree obtained. Data were also collected on the sex, race, hair
color,4 and ethnicity of each employee. Measures of race and ethnicity are obviously
subjective. In general, an employee was considered to be white and non-Hispanic
unless there was direct evidence to the contrary. In the majority of cases it appears
that minorities are members of the various large national associations for minority
journalists such as the National Association of Black Journalists. Membership in
such an organization, mention of the person’s race or origin, or clear visual evidence
were used to decide if a person is black or Asian rather than white. “Hispanic” is an
ethnic identifier rather than a racial characteristic but, in the interest of simplicity
and because nearly all of the Hispanic journalists in the sample would have also
been categorized as “white,” Hispanics were entered as a separate racial category.
As a result, each employee was classified as white, black, other, or Hispanic. All
other races fall into the category of “other,” which is referred to as “Asian” because
of the 125 employees in this category, 2 were Native American and the remaining
123 were Asian.
Table 2.2 reports average characteristics of the on-air staff by race. Interestingly,
minorities are more likely than whites to be a news anchor, a highly visible posi-
tion. Also, fewer minorities, especially Hispanics and Asians, are male. Minorities
also tend to be younger and more educated than their white counterparts. A final
4An indicator of whether an employee was blond was created. This is likely just as subjective
a measure as race, but I included it because I was curious to see if there was any evidence of
preference for blonds.
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Table 2.2: Average Characteristics of On-Air Staff
White Black Hispanic Asian
news anchor 26.0 43.3 34.2 36.8
weather anchor 15.4 5.8 3.1 3.2
sports anchor 7.2 9.2 3.7 3.2
reporter 51.7 41.7 59.0 56.8
male 64.2 50.4 35.4 22.4
age 42.7 41.7 38.3 35.4
state native 25.0 19.7 42.9 21.6
post-college degree 10.8 18.4 13.0 16.0
years at station 9.2 8.7 6.8 4.9
years in local television news 18.9 18.7 15.8 12.7
number stations worked at 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8
number of observations 1850 381 161 125
interesting pattern is that Hispanics and Asians tend to have less experience and
tenure than whites and blacks, but to have worked at a similar number of stations,
suggesting that they may change jobs more frequently.
Station Characteristics
In addition to providing ratings data, Nielsen also furnished data on the number of
people and households in each DMA as well as breaking this down by age, sex, and
black and Hispanic composition. In order to measure the Asian composition of the
markets, data from the 2000 U.S. Census for each corresponding metropolitan area
were used. Therefore, the average characteristics of each market are known, but
ratings and shares were only made available as aggregate numbers and not broken
down by these demographic groups. In addition, local television listings were used
to add information on the number of stations in each DMA that broadcast local
news in English, the number of stations that broadcast local news in Spanish, and
a dummy variable indicating that the DMA has a 24-hour local news station.
Furthermore, the biographical information for each station was aggregated to
calculate average characteristics of each station’s on-air staff such as the percent
who are black and the average tenure at the station. After matching anchors to
time-slots, indicators of the characteristics of the anchor team that is specific to each
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broadcast were also included. However, because reporters do not tend to appear at
regular times, they were not matched to specific broadcasts.
Information was also collected from each station’s regional chapter of the Academy
of Television, Arts, and Sciences, which have annual “Emmy Awards” for their re-
spective regional stations. The awards process requires stations to submit news
tapes for consideration for each category in which an award is granted and the sta-
tion would like to be considered. The tapes are sent to another regional chapter
(there are twenty in all) for review and winners are selected. There can be one,
more than one, or no winner in a particular category. Emmy awards are used as a
proxy for station quality. While the number of categories and the level of compe-
tition differs by region, fixed effects estimators which compare stations in the same
market are used in later analyses, so this issue does not present a problem. For 23
of the 25 DMAs, data from the 2003 local Emmy awards were used. For New York
City and Detroit, which did not have 2003 Emmy information available, data from
the 2004 Emmy awards were used.
Of the 100 possible stations (4 per each of the 25 DMAs), 12 were dropped
because they did not have local news programming or little or no biographical infor-
mation was available, leaving 2, 569 biographical observations for 88 stations across
25 markets. These data were combined with the Nielsen ratings to leave 762 news-
cast observations. One observation might be the weekday 6 p.m. news on the NBC
affiliate in Atlanta, Georgia, and another might be the weekend 11 p.m. news on
another affiliate in the Seattle-Tacoma area. Each of these observations includes the
show’s average rating and share for November 2003 as well as characteristics of the
market, demographic characteristics of the station’s on-air employees and the an-
chors on that particular show, indicators of the amount of competitive programming
at that time, controls for experience, and indicators of the quality of the station’s
local news programming. Table A.1 in the appendix presents a summary of all the
basic variables in the data set.
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The average station has about 29 on-air employees, with an average of 9 news
anchors, 3 weather anchors, 2 sports anchors, and 15 reporters. Twenty-six percent
of the on-air employees in this sample are minorities. This is somewhat larger
than the 21 percent reported by Papper (2003) in his summary of the RTDNA/Ball
State University survey of news directors, but that could be explained by differences
in samples. Specifically, the sample used here is only the 25 largest markets in
the United States while Papper’s results are based on more markets and different
methodology.5 It may simply be the case that stations in larger markets are more
diverse than stations in smaller markets. While there is a large number of minorities
appearing on-air at local news stations, the match between station composition and
market demographics is closer for blacks and Asians than for Hispanics. Local
stations have an average of 15 percent black employees while the average market
is 12 percent black and an average of 5 percent Asian employees while the average
market is 5 percent Asian. However, stations have an average of 6 percent Hispanic
employees while the average market is 14 percent Hispanic. The difference could
be an artifact of methodology: Hispanics may have been miscategorized more often
than the other racial groups.6
While minority representation is fairly high, it is frequently suggested that mi-
nority journalists are relegated to the lower-rated time slots.7 For each show, indi-
cators were constructed for the presence of at least one minority (black, Hispanic,
or Asian) news anchor, a minority weather anchor, and a minority sports anchor.
Table 2.3 summarizes the proportion of shows that have a minority anchor by time
(morning/mid-day or evening) and part of week. The sample proportions suggest
5The RTNDA survey conducted by Papper asked station managers what percent of their staff
are minority.
6The basic assumption when identifying either group was that a person was white unless
“proven” otherwise. Under this rule, to be classified as Hispanic, a person had to have more
than a Spanish surname; he or she had to be a member of an organization of Hispanic journalists,
mention heritage in their biography, or have some other piece of clear evidence. In the case of blacks
and Asians, visual evidence could frequently also be used, making them less likely to be incorrectly
identified as white.
7For example, an article in the St. Petersburg Times reports that some minority journalists
refer to weekends as the “weekend ghetto” (Deggans, 2003).
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Table 2.3: Proportion of Shows with a Minority Anchor
Minority Minority Minority
Time/Week Part News Anchor Weather Anchor Sports Anchor
morning/mid-day 0.61 0.06 0.96
evening 0.51 0.13 0.40
difference* 0 .10 -0 .06 0 .56
weekend 0.47 0.16 0.57
weekday 0.59 0.08 0.71
difference* -0 .12 0 .08 -0 .14
*All sample proportion differences are significant at the 10% level.
that morning news shows are 10 percent more likely to have at least one minority
anchor than are evening newscasts, but that weekend newscasts are 12 percent less
likely than weekday casts to have a minority anchor. This trend is reversed for
minority weather anchors; weekend shows are more likely to have minority weather
anchors, but so are evening shows. The results for news and weather anchors, there-
fore, do not offer consistent evidence that minorities are segregated to lower-rated
slots. However morning and midday shows are 56 percent more likely and weekend
shows are 14 percent less likely to have a minority sports anchor. This trend appears
similar to that for news anchors, but, because many local sporting events take place
on weekends, it is possible that the weekend sportscasts are actually more popular
than weekday sportscasts.8 If this is the case, then it would appear that minority
sports anchors tend to be segregated to lower-rated slots.
While there is no conclusive evidence that minority anchors are segregated to
lower-rated time slots, the possibility of such endogeneity in the relationship between
race and ratings must be addressed. In order to measure the presence and magnitude
of customer racial preferences, it is necessary to see the impact on ratings of an
exogenous change in race. If the race of anchors is also affected by the rating a time
slot can generally be expected to get, then estimates of customer discrimination
8The assertion that weekend sportscasts may be more popular than weekday sportscasts is also
supported by station scheduling of sports news and commentary. Local stations that have special
news sections or news shows devoted to sports almost universally broadcast the additional coverage
on weekends rather than weekdays.
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against minorities could be biased upward. This possibility will be addressed in the
econometric model.
Turning to the market as a whole, the data indicate that there is quite a bit
of competition in the local news market relative, at least, to sports markets where
there is frequently only one home team or only one game being televised on broadcast
television. The average market has 6 stations that broadcast local news in English
and 1 station broadcasting local news in Spanish, and about a third of the cities
have a 24-hour local news station. Additionally, at the time of any given news
broadcast there are an average of 3 broadcasts in English on the air (not including
any broadcasts on 24-hour channels) and 0.3 broadcasts in Spanish. The presence
of competition presents an opportunity to examine the strategic response of firms
to the actions of their rivals.
So far I have shown that stations tend to have a quite a few minorities on-air and
that there is not strong evidence that these minorities are relegated to less visible
positions or time-slots. However, these aggregate statistics mask important intra-
market differences. Table 2.4 reports the average differences between the largest
and smallest station composition variables in a DMA and tests the hypothesis that
this difference is equal to 0. For each of the four measures, the null can strongly
be rejected.9 On average, in each DMA the station with the highest number of
minorities has 4 more minorities on staff than the station with the lowest. Similarly,
the station with the highest minority composition (pctminority) has 12 percentage
points more minorities than the station with the lowest minority composition. This
indicates that the stations within a market area do not look alike: one station has
9This test of the difference in sample proportions relies on a normal approximation of the bi-
nomial distribution. While it presents a simple way to illustrate the variation within markets, the
actual sample sizes here are small enough that the law of large numbers on which the test relies
does not hold. As an alternative, I assumed that the probability of hiring a black (Hispanic) at
each station was equal to the percent of blacks (Hispanics) in the market. For each market, I
then calculated the probability of seeing both a station with the minimum observed composition
and a station with the maximum observed composition. Averaging the results across markets, this
probability was 5.5 percent for blacks and 6.7 percent for Hispanics. So the results still indicate a
significant difference between station composition.
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Table 2.4: Tests of Within-DMA Station Differences
H0 : D sd t-stat P > t
max(no minorities) − min(no minorities) = 0 3.80 2.48 7.65 < 0.001
max(no black) − min(no black) = 0 2.32 1.41 8.25 < 0.001
max(no hisp) − min(no hisp) = 0 1.64 1.66 4.95 < 0.001
max(pctminority) − min(pctminority) = 0 11.98 7.46 8.03 < 0.001
significantly more minorities than another. Stations may be differentiating along
racial lines, but there is nothing in the existing customer discrimination theory that
predicts or explains why this might happen.
2.3 Theoretical model of racial differentiation in response
to customer discrimination
Basic model
Becker’s (1957) well-known model of customer discrimination assumes that cus-
tomers will interact with one employee when they purchase the output of a firm and
that they act as though the price is marked up if that employee is black. He shows
that, in equilibrium, firms will pay a lower wage to black employees and charge a
lower nominal price for their output than for that of white employees. There is no
implication for overall firm composition. In equilibrium, employers are indifferent
between black and white employees; black employees have a lower marginal revenue
product, but also have a lower marginal cost.
However, the assumptions that support this prediction are not always realistic.
In many markets, local news being one, customers cannot interact with only a black
or only a white employee. Rather, a customer will come into contact with many of
a firm’s employees. Incorporating this possibility into Becker’s theoretical model,
and using some of the tools of models of product differentiation, we will see that
firms may, in fact, have a preference for the racial composition of their workforces.
Suppose that there are two possible groups from which a firm can hire employees:
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minorities and non-minorities. Let m ∈ [0, 1] be the percentage of a firm’s workforce
that is composed of minorities. There are N consumers who each purchase one unit
of output and have preferences over the racial composition of a firm so that consumer
i behaves as if he paying P + dim for that unit when he buys it for price P from
a firm with racial composition m. The discrimination coefficient, di, is distributed
uniformly over [L, H]. Note in particular that if L < 0 some consumers have a
preference for interacting with minorities.
Assume that there are two firms in this market and that each can choose the
racial composition of its workforce and the price that it will charge for its output.
This set-up is quite similar to that of a Hotelling-type model of product differenti-
ation and will be solved as a two-stage game in which the firms first choose racial
composition simultaneously and then, given the composition choices, choose prices.10
To solve for the Nash equilibrium, we work in reverse: we first see what the equi-
librium prices are for fixed composition and then solve for the optimal composition
given these prices.
Assume, then, that Firm 1 and Firm 2 have fixed racial compositions m1 and
m2, respectively, and, without loss of generality, that m1 < m2. Then consumer i
will buy from Firm 1 if p1 + dim1 < p2 + dim2. Relying on the uniform distribution











10There is, however, a key difference between the model presented here and a standard model
of product differentiation. In the standard set-up, the distribution of customer tastes lies in the
same space on which the firms locate. However, rather than assuming that each consumer has an
ideal employee racial composition and that there is a uniform distribution of this ideal, I assume
that consumers are either prejudiced (di > 0) or not prejudiced (di < 0) and that it is the intensity
of this preference that varies. I find this specification to be more plausible as well as in keeping
with previous work on discrimination. Moreover, this model’s prediction of differentiation holds
for a wide variety of functional forms for the consumer’s price function. A similar prediction is
found with a standard differentiation model with quadratic transportation costs but, as has been








m1 − m2 − L
)
. (2.2)
Each firm faces the same constant cost c per unit of output. Then Firm i chooses
its price to maximize total profits given by
Πi = (pi − c)Di(pi, p−i). (2.3)
Maximizing this function for each firm and solving for the Nash equilibrium prices,
we obtain
p∗1(m1, m2) = c +
1
3
(L − 2H)(m1 − m2) (2.4)
and
p∗2(m1, m2) = c +
1
3
(2L − H)(m1 − m2). (2.5)
Moving to the choice of composition given the optimal prices, each firm will
choose m to maximize the reduced-form profit function
Πi(m1, m2) = [p∗i (m1, m2) − c]Di[m1, m2, p∗1(m1, m2), p∗2(m1, m2)]. (2.6)
Noting that in the Stage 1 maximization problem each firm sets Di+(pi−c)∂Di/∂pi =
0 and using the envelope theorem,
dΠ1
dm1
















































So, in equilibrium, m∗1 = 0 and m∗2 = 1; that is, Firm 1 will always choose
to have a workforce that is all non-minority while Firm 2 will be made up solely
of minorities. The equilibrium price differential will depend on the distribution of
tastes. If L > 0, then Firm 2, which is all minority, will charge a lower price than
Firm 1, which is all white. However, if L and H are sufficiently low (H < −L) so
that there is a relatively large number of consumers with preferences for minorities
relative to those who are prejudiced against them, Firm 2 will charge a higher price
than Firm 1.
This model of racial differentiation has implications for what we might see em-
pirically. Firms will want to differentiate by racial composition in order to gain
control of certain segments of the market. The equilibrium relationship between
racial composition and demand depends on the distribution of consumer prefer-
ences. In the case where H < −L, that is in which there are more consumers who
prefer minorities than do not, firms with low minority composition will charge less
and have lower demand than their rivals. But if H > −L, that is if more consumers
are prejudiced against minorities than prefer them, then firms with low minority
composition will cater to the most prejudiced consumers and will charge more and
have greater demand than their competitors. Moreover, the response of demand
to changes in firm composition would be different for the different firm types. For
instance, in the case where all consumers are prejudiced, we could see a more sharp
decline in demand in response to an increase in minorities for low-minority firms
than for high minority firms which cater to the less-prejudiced customers.
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Incorporating costs of altering racial composition
One potential shortcoming of this theoretical model is that the prediction of maxi-
mal product differentiation seems extreme. Given the presence of equal employment
opportunity (EEO) laws and racial differentials in labor supply, it may be quite ex-
pensive for firms to differentiate completely. To incorporate this possibility, suppose
that Firm i incurs an additional cost of altering its racial composition from arbi-
trary level R which might be, for instance, the racial composition of the market as
a whole. This cost could be the result of increasing the risk of lawsuits under EEO
laws or of increasing search costs as a firm attempts to find minorities to fill all of its
slots. Given quadratic costs of adjusting racial composition, Firm i’s profit function
is
Πi = (pi − c)Di(pi, p−i) − (mi − R)2. (2.11)
This cost of altering racial composition does not affect the demand functions or
firm i’s best response price function, but does alter its location decision. Now the
Nash equilibrium compositions are:
m∗1 = max
[



















(2L − H)2, 1
]
∈ [0, 1]. (2.13)
So, if there is a cost of adjusting composition, the firms will differentiate, but not
necessarily completely. The equilibrium distance between them depends on the size















H − L ≥ 0 (2.15)
So, as the population size, N , grows, the degree of separation increases. However,
the comparative statics for consumer preferences are not straightforward. The effect
of changes in L and H on product differentiation depends on the size and sign of L
and H.
2.4 Analysis of Station Composition and Customer Pref-
erences
I will first look at firm racial composition to see if the characteristics of competitors
are negatively related, and I will then look at the effect of these characteristics on
demand to see if it is consistent with the model of product differentiation.
Racial Composition of Employees
The theoretical model presented in the preceding section suggests that a station’s
racial composition is negatively correlated with the composition of the other stations
in the market. But it can also depend on employer discrimination and the demo-
graphic characteristics of the market. The characteristics of the market are not so
important as a measure of the potential labor pool, but rather because of how they
interact with EEO laws.11 While the rules and enforcement of EEO laws in the
local television industry have changed over previous decades, since their enactment
in 1967, station racial composition has generally been compared to the composition
of the surrounding market.
In order to analyze the determinants of employee composition, I use the station-
level data to estimate random effects regressions of racial and gender composition
11Journalists appear to move easily and frequently between markets. In this sample, the average
journalist has worked at 4 stations and at the average station only a quarter of employees are
natives of that state.
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(pctblack, pcthispanic, pctasian, pctfemale) and age composition (age, the average
age of on-air employees at a station) that allow for possible correlation of the error
terms within markets. Explanatory variables include station and market character-
istics.12
A potential concern is that the right-hand-side variable measuring the average
composition of competing stations may be correlated with unobserved market char-
acteristics. Consider, for instance, the regression for station black composition:
pctblack = α1 + dmapctblackα2 + (other stat pctblack)α3 + Xα4 + ε (2.16)
where X contains additional station and market characteristics listed in Table 2.5.
The theoretical model predicts that α3, the coefficient on the average composition
of competing stations, should be negative. However, any unobserved market char-
acteristics that influence the composition of other stations should also influence the
composition of the observed station. For instance, suppose that stations in more
educated markets are more likely to hire minorities. Because education is not ob-
served, α3 will be biased upward. In fact, any unobserved market characteristic that
influences station composition should have a similar effect for all stations. There-
fore, to the extent that negative correlation is observed in the presence of unobserved
market characteristics, this only bolsters the results.
However, an endogeneity problem remains due to the fact that racial composition
regressions represent a system for each market in which the composition of station
i is determined by the average composition of the remaining stations in the market.
The appendix presents a brief derivation of the statistical properties of the estimator
12A negative binomial count model for the actual number of employees from any one group was
also estimated as was a truncated dependent variable model. Both yielded similar results. Another
possibility is that there is substitution between worker types. That would suggest a system of
equations with endogenous dependent variables, but no instrument suggests itself for identifying
these variables. However, in that case, omitting measures of the station composition from the
right hand side as done here could lead to bias. If, for instance, black and Hispanic workers are
substitutes, then anything that tends to increase demand for one group will decrease the demand
for the other group. This possibility should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
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of α3 in such a system. In the case of positive correlation between the error terms
(as seems likely), the probability of rejection for a negative coefficient estimate is
not overstated. However, it is possible that if the relationship between station
compositions is positive and very large, the expected value of the estimate could
be negative. For this reason, I proceed with the racial composition regressions but
note that, while a significant negative estimate is likely to indicate a true negative
correlation between composition, the magnitude of the effect will be biased.
Table 2.5 reports the results of the five regressions. There is not much evidence
of discrimination by employers. An indicator that a station has a minority station
manager and/or news director, minmanager, was included in order to see if the
race of managers has any relationship with the race of employees. For instance,
white managers may discriminate against black employees while black managers
may not.13 However, the coefficient is positive and significant only in the sex re-
gression, indicating that minority managers are positively correlated with female
employees. An indicator that a station has a female manager was also included, but
the coefficient is not significant in any of the regressions.14 It is possible that station
managers and news directors do not bear all of the burden of hiring decisions. But
in this case, one would expect that there would be a positive correlation between
the characteristics of managers and on-air staff because both are employees subject
to the same employer discrimination. That there is not strong evidence of this only
further supports the conclusion that employer discrimination does not play a role
13Antonovics and Knight (2004), for example, use evidence from traffic stops in Boston to show
that police officers are more likely to conduct a search if the driver is of another race, suggesting
that racial preferences vary by race.
14Because it was especially difficult to collect information on the characteristics of station man-
agers, the race of the station manager or news director is only known for 49 of the 88 stations.
Hence, the coefficient on minmanager is actually comparing the impact of a minority manager
relative to a white manager or to a manager of unknown race. This could be the source of the
lack of significance in the remaining 3 regressions. However, the results are similar if a dummy
indicating that manager race was not observed is included. Because manager names were more
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As suggested by the theoretical model, there is a significant negative relationship
between the racial compositions of stations within a market. A 1 percentage point
increase in the average percent black at other stations in a market is correlated with
a 0.5 percentage point decrease in a station’s own percent black. And a 1 percentage
point increase in the average percent Hispanic at other stations is correlated with a
decrease of 1.1 percentage points in own percent Hispanic. Similar trends hold for sex
and age. A 1 percentage point increase in the average percent female at competing
stations is correlated with a 0.9 percentage point decrease in percent female. And a
one year increase in the average age of employees at competing stations is correlated
with an own average age decrease of four months. While there is no evidence of this
sorting for Asian employees, this is also the only one of the categories in which the
market composition is proxied with Census data on the metropolitan area because
Nielsen did not provide information on Asian market composition.
The negative correlation between the representation of a group at a station
and at its competitors suggests that there is some intra-market sorting going on
among competing stations. In some markets, this might be the result of a small
pool of potential employees, so that if a firm hires a black employee, the ability
of its competitors to hire one is reduced. However, as mentioned before, television
journalists move frequently between stations and regions, suggesting that even if a
particular market does not have many minorities, that does not mean that there are
no minorities available to hire. Furthermore, with its reputation as a tough field to
crack, there appears to be no shortage of potential journalists of any race. Hence,
it seems likely that results are indicative of racial differentiation by firms.
While the evidence supports sorting among stations, there is also a significant
positive relationship between the racial composition of a market and the composition
15Another way to look for employer discrimination is to control for the corporate owner of a
station. There are 23 corporate owners (such as News Corp., Gannett, Disney, etc.) in this sample.
However, coefficients on owner indicators were neither individually nor jointly significant.
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of all stations within it. A 1 percentage point increase in the percent of a market’s
population that is black is correlated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the
percent black at a station. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in the percent
of a market’s population that is Hispanic is correlated with a 0.7 percentage point
increase in the percent Hispanic at a station. There do not, however, appear to be
cross-racial effects for markets and stations; the percent black in a market is not
significantly related to the percent Hispanic at a station and vice versa. Looking at
females, there is a large effect of the gender composition of a city on the composition
of a station, an especially surprising result given the low variance in dmapctfemale,
which only ranges from 50 to 53 percent in this sample. With the exception of age,
therefore, it seems that the characteristics of television journalists are related to the
corresponding characteristics of the market.
As previously mentioned, it is not clear to what extent this finding might rep-
resent the effects of labor supply, station response to audience demand, and the
impact of EEO laws. In particular, because of their enforcement by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), EEO laws may play an especially large role
in the hiring decisions of local stations. In order to examine this possibility, I take
advantage of several shifts in the provisions and enforcement of these laws by the
FCC.
EEO laws actually encompass a range of congressional acts pertaining to job
discrimination. The first and most well known is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which forbids employers from discriminating based on a variety of
characteristics. In response to this act, the FCC, which oversees the federal licensing
of local stations, began requiring stations to submit written reports summarizing
the composition of their employees in 1970. Stations that had 50 or more employees
or that did not have sufficient minorities on staff relative to the composition of
their market were reviewed by the FCC at licensing renewal time. In 1987 the
FCC modified its policy to place greater weight on recruitment efforts and, as a
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Table 2.6: EEO Enforcement Regimes
Regime Time Period Enforcement
Regime 1 1970-1986 Beginning of FCC regulation: Stations submit
written EEO reports to FCC. Stations that did
not employ sufficient numbers of minorities rela-
tive to their market were examined closely at the
time of license renewal.
Regime 2 1987-1997 Stricter regulations: FCC shifts emphasis to mi-
nority outreach and recruitment. Stations must
submit additional forms detailing these efforts and
results continue to be tied to license renewal
Regime 3 1998-1999 No regulations: FCC practices are ruled unconsti-
tutional in 1998 and are suspended.
Regime 4 2000-2003 Fluctuating regulations: FCC tries two sets of
rules that tie EEO compliance to licensing.
result, the amount of required paperwork and monitoring increased. However, in
1998 the tying of federal licensing to these requirements was ruled unconstitutional
and the FCC suspended its EEO program, leading to a two year period in which no
FCC enforcement was in place. In 2000 the FCC implemented a new standard but
this was also quickly ruled unconstitutional, leading to another period during which
the FCC did not attempt to mandate or enforce adherence to EEO guidelines.
In 2003 the FCC again promulgated regulations that required stations to submit
information on their minority recruitment efforts and, again, compliance was tied
to license renewal. These changes present several natural “regimes” of EEO laws,
summarized in Table 2.6.
While I do not have data on station racial composition over time, I do know when
most current employees were hired. In order to get an idea of the importance of FCC
enforcement of EEO laws, I estimate a set of regressions of the percent of employees
who are black and hired during a particular regime (pct(black ∗ regimej=i)) on
market racial composition. The regression is of the form
pct(black ∗ regimej=i) = dmapctblackβ1 + pct(black ∗ regimej =i)β2 + ε. (2.17)
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β1 measures the relationship between the market composition in 2003 and station
composition during each regime. β2 is included to attempt to minimize the impact
of these regressions being based only on employees who were both hired during a
particular regime and are presently at the station. For instance, the percent of
employees who are black and who were hired before 1987 could be low because of
attrition. In that event, there would be more blacks hired during later regimes to
replace those lost previously, which would be picked up by the second coefficient,
preventing the impact of the city racial composition from being biased downward.
Table 2.7 reports the estimates for β1 for regressions where the dependent vari-
able is percent black during each of the 4 regimes, as well as separate regressions
for Hispanics and Asians.16 Looking at the results for blacks, the impact of the
racial composition of a market on the hiring practices of a station increases between
regimes 1 and 2 as FCC enforcement becomes stricter, decreases with Regime 3 and
the period of lax enforcement, and increases again with Regime 4 and the implemen-
tation of new rules. The R2 for each of the regressions for blacks also increases with
stricter regimes. A similar trend is evident for Hispanics and Asians, suggesting
that market composition has more power in explaining station composition during
periods of stricter EEO regulations and enforcement. This evidence, therefore, does
indicate that FCC enforcement of EEO regulations in the local television market has
had an impact on station hiring practices. However, even during recent periods of
confusing or absent enforcement, there is still a significant and positive relationship
between the racial composition of a city and minority hiring at stations, indicating
that while it does place some constraint on stations, EEO enforcement is not the
only driving force behind minority hiring.
Customer Preferences
Ratings regressions measure the effect of employee characteristics on customer de-
16Only 2 blacks and no Hispanics or Asians were hired by their station before 1970, so the analysis
does not include the period before 1970
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Table 2.7: Impact of DMA Composition on Minority Hiring over Time
Blacks Hispanics Asians
dma dma dma
dependent variable: pctblack R2 pcthispanic R2 pctasian R2
pct(regime1 ∗ race) 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.06
pct(regime2 ∗ race) 0.43 0.32 0.20 0.45 0.31 0.24
pct(regime3 ∗ race) 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.31 0.20 0.15
pct(regime4 ∗ race) 0.68 0.40 0.25 0.50 0.43 0.23
*bold coefficients are significant at 10% level
mand.17 Regressions are of the form
ratingijt = α + Sijβ1 + N ijtβ2 + υijt, (2.18)
where ratingijt is the rating of show i in market j at time-slot t, Sij is a vector
of containing the characteristics of the station, and N ijt is a vector containing the
characteristics of that particular newscast. It is plausible and indeed, Hausman
specification tests indicate that there are certain unobserved effects that are partic-
ular to a time slot in a given market and are correlated with the regressors. For
instance, if minorities are indeed assigned to slots that are expected to receive low
ratings, then the estimated effect of racial composition may be downward biased.
In an attempt to account for this possibility, the specification incorporates market
and time fixed effects. In other words, the estimates are based on differences in
outcomes for newscasts in the same market at the same time of day (e.g., early
morning weekdays, etc.).
Table 2.8 reports the results for the above model using a matching specification to
measure station composition. The racial and gender composition of a station is mea-
sured relative to the same characteristics of the market.18 These weighted variables
17Another option would be to use share as the dependent variable rather than rating. Because
share measures viewership only as a fraction of those watching TV, this would essentially measure
preferences conditional on turning the television on at all, while rating is unconditional on this. If,
for instance, customers are prejudiced against blacks and tend not to watch television when blacks
are on, the effect of race may be underestimated. In this instance, the results of regressions using
share are only a little smaller than the results from the ratings regressions.
18Age is not weighted because Nielsen did not provide detailed age characteristics of markets
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can be thought of as matching measures; the variables blackmatch, hispanicmatch,
asianmatch and femalematch are the ratios of station composition to market com-
position multiplied by 100. So, if blackmatch is equal to 100, the station exactly
matches the black composition of the city while if blackmatch is less than 100 the
station under-represents blacks and if blackmatch is greater than 100 the station
over-represents blacks. Using the matching specification allows for the possibility
that the effect of adding blacks is different in markets with different racial composi-
tions. In addition to these variables measuring the overall composition of journalists
at a station, there are also indicators for the sex and minority status of the news,
weather, and sports anchors on the particular newscast being observed.19
Turning to the results, only 2 of the 6 anchor variables, which are matched
to each newscast, are significant. The significant estimates suggest that if a male
news anchor is replaced with a female one, ratings decline by 0.61 percentage points
and if a white weather anchor is replaced with a minority one, ratings decline by
0.51 percentage points. The insignificance of the remaining anchor variables could
indicate that the effect of the specific anchors on any one show is not large; or, it
could be a product of the small sample size.
The variables measuring overall station composition, however, do suggest that
customers have preferences for employee characteristics over all of the dimensions
examined. The coefficient on pctblond suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in
the percent of employees who are blond yields ratings that are 0.1 percentage points
higher.20 Because specification tests indicate that cubic functions are appropriate
for the remaining composition variables, the matching variables for average station
characteristics were entered along with their squares and cubes. Figure 2.1 shows the
19More detailed indicators for anchor team composition were also considered so that,for instance,
a solo white male anchor could be compared to a black male/white female duo and so on. However,
these more detailed indicators were jointly insignificant.
20Interacting hair color with sex did not indicate that there was a significant difference in how
customers respond to blond women relative to blond men. However, the sample of blond men was
much smaller.
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Table 2.8: Fixed Effects Ratings Regressions
dep. variable: average Nielsen rating for November 2003
coef se coef se
Employee Characteristics Anchor Characteristics
pctnative -0.021 0.009 sport anch 1.164 0.287
pcthighed -0.019 0.013 duo -0.203 0.237
tenure 0.369 0.062 trio 1.1x10−4 0.504
experience -0.015 0.029 min. anchor 0.178 0.156
no. stations 0.633 0.301 female anchor -0.610 0.356
pctblond 0.122 0.019 min. weather -0.507 0.247
age -18.380 9.245 female weather -0.236 0.173
age2 0.434 0.224 min. sports 0.229 0.236
age3 -0.003 0.002 female sports -0.111 0.527
female match 1.149 0.295 Station Characteristics
female match2 -0.015 0.004 NBC 2.305 0.256
female match3 6.4x10−5 1.8X10−5 CBS 1.468 0.287
black match -0.118 0.018 ABC 2.279 0.280
black match2 0.001 1.2X10−4 length 0.254 0.054
black match3 -1.74x10−6 2.48X10−7 pct emmys 0.024 0.004
hispanic match 0.052 0.015 post network -0.823 0.211
hispanic match2 -3.9x10−4 2.2x10−4 pre network 0.305 0.188
hispanic match3 -2.3x10−8 8.0x10−7 no. persons 0.011 0.021
asian match 0.018 0.005 min. manager -0.544 0.317
asian match2 7.1x10−5 2.6x10−5 female manager 0.469 0.207
asian match3 8.5x10−8 3.3x10−8 constant 228.363 125.662
*bold coefficients are significant at 10% level
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estimated mean of a show’s rating conditional on the five composition variables.21
Looking at the graph for the effect of the match between station percent black and
market percent black, ratings initially decline as black representation at a station
increases but, as station composition begins to exceed market composition, ratings
develop a positive relationship with black composition. A similar result holds for
age, although it appears that the negative effect of age diminishes as average age
increases but does not exhibit a strong positive trend. For gender composition,
there is a negative but decreasing effect of adding women. The shapes of these
functions are not consistent with Becker’s model of customer discrimination in which
diminishing marginal utility would cause the negative impact of race to increase with
minority representation. They are also not explained by a taste for diversity, since
this would suggest that the functions would be concave. However, the decline in the
negative response as composition increases is consistent with the theory of station
differentiation in which stations sort in response to customer prejudices against
blacks, women, and older workers, yielding p1 < p2. The results for blacks, for
example, suggest that those stations with a relatively low composition of blacks are
catering to consumers with a high discrimination coefficient, while those stations
with more blacks are catering to consumers who are without such strong prejudice
against blacks or even have preferences for them. However, if the black composition
variable becomes high enough, ratings will begin to decline again, suggesting that
at very high levels of representation (when there are more than 2 and a half times
as many blacks on the station than in the market, which is only observed for a few
outlying stations and hence not shown on the domain of the graph), even the less
prejudiced consumers begin to exhibit a strong response.
Turning to the remaining two graphs in Figure 2.1, the results indicate that at
least some consumers have a preference for Hispanics and Asians. Looking at His-
panics, ratings increase over low levels of composition but decline with the addition
21The functions are evaluated over the 10th to 90th percentiles of the independent variables that
are observed in the data.
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Figure 2.1: Effects of Employee Compositions on Ratings
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of more Hispanic employees when hispanicmatch exceeds 60. Similarly for Asians,
ratings increase with Asian representation among employees until that representa-
tion exceeds Asian composition in the market. The concavity of these functions is
not consistent with the model of differentiation, but instead could suggest a taste
for diversity in which consumers prefer to see about half as many Hispanics and
about the same number of Asians on television as are in the market. However, as
mentioned earlier, Hispanics may have been categorized incorrectly more often than
other groups. If, for instance, Hispanics employees in markets with fewer Hispanics
were less likely to acknowledge or point out their ethnicity than were employees in
more Hispanic markets, this could bias the estimates. Finally, stations that broad-
cast in Spanish or other languages are not included in this sample. It could simply
be the case that these stations cater to customers with the greatest taste for seeing
Hispanic or Asian minority groups.
In addition to measures of the characteristics of the on-air staff, indicators for a
female and minority manager were also included in the ratings regressions as a sort
of check on the results. Assuming that managers are much less visible to customers
than the on-air journalists, their race or sex should not have an effect on ratings.
However, the estimates suggest a positive and significant effect for female managers
and a negative and significant effect for minority managers. If these managers were
visible, the results could indicate some preference of customers. An alternative
explanation might be that there is some fundamental difference in the productivity
of the two groups in these positions. Or perhaps these two groups are assigned to
different types of stations, so there is endogeneity here. In either event, it is possible
that the results for the on-air cast members could also be picking up some effect
other than strict racial preferences.
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2.5 Conclusion
Understanding the role and nature of customer discrimination is an important com-
ponent of understanding differential outcomes in labor markets because, to the
extent that customer preferences drive outcomes, competition will not necessar-
ily eliminate discrimination. However, empirical studies have tended to focus on a
single market–that for sports– and, even within this somewhat limited arena, have
provided a variety of findings.
This chapter presents a look at another labor market and a different group of
employees in order to infer the preferences of customers there. While the initial
motivation was driven by the observation of a high number of minorities on local
television news and by an attempt to see if customers might have preferences for
some level of diversity, a closer examination of the local news market provided evi-
dence of a previously unconsidered phenomenon on the employer side: local stations
appear to be sorting along racial lines. While very few television stations are all
white (most likely as a result of FCC enforcement of EEO laws), there is signifi-
cant variation in racial composition within a market that is masked by averages.
The theoretical model presented in Section 3 demonstrates that if customers have a
distribution of preferences for the composition of firms, firms will compete through
racial differentiation.
The empirical findings support this model and suggest another layer of complex-
ity to consider with the basic Becker model of customer discrimination. Local news
stations appear to respond to the racial composition of their competitors and to try
to differentiate themselves by race, age, and sex of their on-air employees. For three
of the five groups examined, the ratings regressions indicate that the response of con-
sumers varies with the racial composition of the firms in a manner consistent with
the predictions of this model of racial differentiation. Viewers of the more “white”
stations have a stronger negative reaction to an increase in blacks than do viewers
of the “black” stations, suggesting that stations with few blacks cater to consumers
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with a high discrimination coefficient against blacks, while stations with more blacks
cater to customers who are less prejudiced or who prefer blacks. Similarly, viewers of
stations with more females and older employees have a smaller negative response to
these groups than viewers of stations with lower concentrations. While the results
for Hispanics and Asians suggest a customer preference for diversity rather than
differentiation or strict racial preferences as originally modeled in the literature, it
seems likely that the exclusion of foreign language local news has biased the esti-
mates. Taken as a whole, the results here suggest that customer discrimination may




Differentials in U.S. Housing
Prices
3.1 Introduction
Research on racial housing price differentials has yielded vastly different results
ranging from indications in the early literature that black households pay premiums
for housing to estimates of significant discounts in the more recent literature. This
decline and reversal of the differential might be due to a reduction in discriminatory
practices over the past forty years. However, differences in estimation techniques
and data sets may also explain some, perhaps all, of the perceived decline.
The key to identifying the results of discrimination is to ask whether blacks pay
different amounts than whites for identical housing. This requires controlling not
only for characteristics of the house itself, but also for characteristics of the sur-
rounding neighborhood. Controlling for neighborhood effects is important for two
reasons. First, as described below, economic theory predicts that discrimination can
produce price differentials within a neighborhood, while prejudice and segregation
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produce price differentials between neighborhoods. Thus, if neighborhood charac-
teristics are not controlled for, these forces will be confused and it will be impossible
to separate the causes of an observed racial price differential. Second, evidence sug-
gests that black neighborhoods tend to have relatively higher crime rates, lower
wealth, poorer provision of public goods, and other negative characteristics.1 Since
being black is correlated with living in a black neighborhood, a researcher who does
not control for neighborhood characteristics may find that blacks tend to pay less
for housing than do whites. Such a result would be biased by neighborhood quality
and would not reliably indicate the presence or absence of discrimination.2
In relatively recent studies such as Chambers (1992) and Kiel and Zabel (1996),
researchers have typically used large national data sets and, if they controlled for
neighborhood characteristics at all, have used census tracts or larger areas as neigh-
borhood proxies. Census tracts, the smallest areas that have been used, have be-
tween 1,500 and 8,000 inhabitants, with an optimum given by the census bureau
of 4,000 inhabitants (United States Census Bureau, 2000). Given that the Census
Bureau (2001) reports that the average number of people per household in the U.S.
was 2.62 in 2000, a census tract with 4,000 inhabitants would represent about 1,527
houses or about 100 city blocks of 15 houses each. Although the Census Bureau
intends them to be proxies for neighborhoods, it seems likely that there is still sub-
stantial variation within tracts with such a large number of houses. The results of
studies using these proxies indicate that blacks receive price discounts relative to
whites. However, since neighborhood racial composition and other amenities may
have been insufficiently controlled for, this negative finding could be due to the ten-
dency of blacks to live in lower-priced black neighborhoods rather than due to the
absence of discriminatory behavior of suppliers.
This chapter attempts to remedy this problem by controlling for neighborhoods
1See, for example, Harris (1999).
2It can certainly be argued that the poor quality of some black neighborhoods is a result of
racism in the housing market. However, in order to clearly identify how different factors affect
price differentials it is necessary to separate these effects from those of pure discrimination in which
blacks pay different prices for identical housing.
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at a much smaller level than that of census tracts. The 1985, 1989, and 1993 na-
tional American Housing Surveys (AHS) contain a special “neighbors sample” that
is composed of sub-sampled “kernel” housing units and observations about the ten
nearest neighbors of each. Using these data, I control for the racial composition,
educational attainment, income levels and other characteristics of neighborhoods de-
fined by relatively small areas that should be more homogenous than census tracts.
By using information about the composition of the neighbor group surrounding each
household, I hope to more thoroughly control for neighborhood effects, and thus be
able to separate any racial price differential into portions that are (i) due to neigh-
borhood effects and (ii) due to supplier discrimination. I also deviate from previous
studies, which have used only cross-sectional techniques, and take advantage of the
time series characteristics of the AHS. Once neighborhood and other unobserved
effects are controlled for, a finding that blacks pay less than whites for identical
housing would corroborate other recent studies in indicating that supplier price dis-
crimination against blacks is not present. On the other hand, a finding that blacks
pay more than whites for housing would indicate that bias due to unobserved effects
has tainted other recent results and that price discrimination continues.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews eco-
nomic theory on racial housing price differentials. Section 3 describes how previous
empirical studies have attempted to separate the types of differentials predicted by
this theory. I proceed with a description of the data set used in this study, an outline
of the econometric model, and a description of the results. Section 7 concludes with
a summary of findings.
3.2 Theoretical Models of Racial Housing Price Differ-
entials
Before outlining the three major theoretical sources of racial housing price differ-
entials, it is important to distinguish between discrimination, prejudice, and seg-
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regation. These terms not only mean different things, but their presence also has
different implications for housing market outcomes. Prejudice is defined as an atti-
tude about a group of people; it does not necessarily result in direct adverse action
against that group. Discrimination, on the other hand, is some action or treatment
of a group that differs from that received by others. Finally, segregation is the
physical separation of two groups. Economic theory suggests three major sources
of racial price differentials: supplier price discrimination, consumer prejudice, and
segregation. The impact of these factors on prices varies in direction and in whether
the differential would be observed within or between neighborhoods. I describe each
factor in turn.
Supplier Price Discrimination
First, price differentials could result from supplier price discrimination. Applying
Becker’s (1957) approach to discrimination, if suppliers such as landlords, real estate
agents, and owners do not like to deal with blacks and will do so only if they receive
a premium, then one would expect this discriminatory behavior to result in blacks
paying more for a comparable unit of housing than whites. This is an instance
of price discrimination by suppliers and its effects can be captured by comparing
the prices that blacks and whites pay for identical housing. However, if blacks
and whites do not tend to live in the same neighborhoods, they may not consume
identical housing since neighborhood is a key component of housing services. So, in
order to attempt to find evidence of supplier price discrimination, it is necessary to
control for neighborhood characteristics and effects. Once this is done, the effects
of supplier price discrimination can be captured by including dummy variables for
the race of the household head. The coefficient on a dummy variable indicating that
the household head is black, for instance, would measure any difference in the price




Two well-known models demonstrate how private preferences for racial composition
can create inter-neighborhood price differentials. Bailey’s “border model” assumes
that blacks and whites are segregated into black central city neighborhoods and
white suburban neighborhoods (Bailey, 1966). It also assumes that both blacks and
whites prefer living in white neighborhoods. Competition ensures that the prices
that blacks and whites pay for housing in the border areas of their neighborhoods
will be equal. Furthermore, because whites prefer to live far from blacks, whites
will pay more for housing in the white interior than in the border areas. And
because blacks prefer to live close to whites blacks will pay less for housing in the
black interior than in the border area. Combining these results, in the absence of
discrimination, the model predicts that prices in the interior of black neighborhoods
will be lower than prices in the interior of white neighborhoods and that prices in
border areas will be intermediate.
Courant and Yinger (1977) provide an overview and criticism of border models.
They describe two major flaws. First, to ensure that whites and blacks remain
segregated in equilibrium, restrictive assumptions must be added to the model.
Either blacks must be indifferent to racial composition or all whites must be willing
to pay more than any black to live in a white neighborhood.3 Otherwise, there is
nothing to keep blacks from simply moving into the white neighborhoods that they
prefer, which would contradict the assumptions of the model. Another problem is
that this model does not have an equilibrium solution if black incomes can vary.
It is possible for a wealthy black demander to outbid a poor white demander for
housing in the white interior.
3The assumption that blacks are indifferent to racial composition seems especially strong given
the evidence against it. Researchers have used survey data on neighborhood preferences and have
found that whites tend to prefer living in predominantly white neighborhoods and that blacks
tend to prefer integrated areas. See for instance, Farley et al. (1997). On the other hand, it is
unclear to what extent respondents incorporate neighborhood characteristics that are correlated
with race. For example, a white respondent who expresses discomfort with the idea of living in a
predominantly black neighborhood may do so not because he dislikes the idea of living near blacks
but because he considers that there are likely to be fewer and poorer quality services provided in
such a neighborhood.
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Yinger (1976) revised Bailey’s border model. In border models whites and
blacks are completely segregated and whites derive disutility from living near the
black/white border. In the Yinger model whites and blacks derive disutility or utility
from living with and near the other race. This key difference in how prejudice enters
the utility function allows Yinger to abandon the restrictive assumption of border
models that a city starts off completely segregated and instead to model whites and
blacks as caring about the racial composition of the area in which they live. Yinger
shows that the coefficient on racial composition in a regression on value or rent
will measure the effects of prejudice in this model. If the coefficient on a variable
measuring the percent of neighborhood occupants who are black is negative, then
there is evidence that prejudice against blacks lowers prices in neighborhoods as the
proportion of black inhabitants increases. Since the degree of prejudice and, hence,
the magnitude of such a coefficient could differ across different neighborhood types,
Yinger suggests that racial composition should be interacted with dummy variables
measuring whether a neighborhood is predominantly white, black, or integrated.
What Yinger does not discuss is that if one includes both observations for white
and black households, then the coefficient on racial composition will measure a
combination of white and black racial preferences. In this case, the coefficient on
racial composition tells us what the effect of prejudice is, but does not divide the
price differential into portions that are a result of white and black attitudes. Hence
it is preferable to also interact racial composition with the race of the household
head to fully separate the effects of black and white prejudice. However, due to
data limitations, this will not be done in this chapter, leaving the source of any
measured prejudice unclear.
Segregation
Segregation describes the physical separation of two groups. It may be the result of
supplier price discrimination limiting the housing choices of blacks or of prejudicial
attitudes among consumers that lead to an equilibrium separation. If either of these
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is the case, segregation would be the result of the two sources of price differentials
already described. However, there are other possible sources of segregation. It could
also result from non-price discrimination such as the steering of black home-seekers
to certain neighborhoods, red-lining mortgage applications, government confinement
of a group to ghettos, or other methods of threat or coercion that limit the neigh-
borhood choices of a group. Also, the exclusion may not be based strictly on race.
For example, it could also be the case that “poor” housing is restricted to a small
area and that blacks tend to live in poor areas.
Whatever the source of the segregation, economic theory predicts that the exclu-
sion itself could generate inter-neighborhood housing price differentials.4 Suppose
that blacks are trapped in a central ghetto. If the boundaries of black neighbor-
hoods are relatively fixed, increasing population pressures within them would result
in higher prices in black neighborhoods than in white ones. A finding that ceteris
paribus black neighborhoods tend to have more expensive housing would provide ev-
idence that a combination of exclusion and population pressures are pushing prices
upward in black neighborhoods.
This simple prediction about the direct effect of exclusion, however, is compli-
cated by consideration of its source. If segregation is the result of supplier price
discrimination, one would expect to find that blacks pay more than whites for hous-
ing in white neighborhoods, but that housing prices in black neighborhoods are
higher than those in white neighborhoods. In other words, one would find evidence
of intra-neighborhood differentials and inter-neighborhood differentials. In this case,
of course, the source of both differentials would be supplier discrimination, but the
effects of such discrimination would have been separately identified. Similarly, if
segregation is the result of prejudice, one would expect to find that housing values
fall with increases in the composition of blacks in a neighborhood, but that black
neighborhoods tend to cost more than white neighborhoods. Cutler et al. (1999), Ih-
lanfeldt and Scafidi (2002), and Ross (2002) have focused on explaining the sources
4See Yinger (1978) and King and Mieszkowski (1973).
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of segregation. This chapter follows a different tack by attempting to identify the
direct effects of supplier price discrimination and demander prejudice and also in-
cluding the effect of segregation only in so far as it can create intra-neighborhood
population pressures. The source of segregation is not identified. Note that these
three explanations (price discrimination, prejudice, and segregation) for racial price
differentials have different implications. Price discrimination is the only theory that
predicts intra-neighborhood racial price differentials. Exclusion and prejudice pre-
dict inter-neighborhood price differentials between neighborhoods of differing racial
composition. Hence, if one wishes to examine racial differentials in housing prices it
is necessary to control for the racial composition of the neighborhood within which
a house is located. Only then is it possible to separate inter-neighborhood and
intra-neighborhood outcomes and obtain evidence about the presence and nature of
discriminatory behavior, exclusion, and prejudice.
3.3 Previous Empirical Literature
The first empirical studies of racial differentials in housing prices tend to use small
data sets with information on the racial composition of the immediate block sur-
rounding a household. King and Mieszkowski (1973) employ special survey data
from 1968-1969 for approximately 220 rental units in New Haven, Connecticut that
allow them to control for a renter’s race as well as for the racial composition of a
neighborhood and whether the neighborhood is in what they term the black ghetto,
white interior, or boundary areas. The authors find that blacks pay about 7 per-
cent more than whites in the boundary areas, evidence of supplier discrimination.
Yinger (1978) finds similar results using 1967 data on St. Louis. He estimates that
blacks pay approximately 14 percent more than whites for housing in any given
neighborhood. He also finds that black neighborhoods tend to be more expensive
and that increasing the percentage of black residents in any given neighborhood
lowers housing prices there. This indicates both that exclusion may play a role in
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increasing prices in black neighborhoods and that prejudice decreases prices in any
given neighborhood as more blacks move in.
Studies such as King and Mieszkowski’s and Yinger’s provide careful controls
for neighborhood composition but are limited by small data sets for specific cities
and the results are now dated. Follain and Malpezzi (1981) attempt to address
the former problem by using metropolitan data for 39 SMSA’s from the Annual
Housing Survey (AHS). Running separate regressions for owners and renters, the
authors find that black owners pay an average of 15 percent less and black renters
pay 6 percent less than whites, a result that is dramatically different from previously
estimated premiums. However, the only neighborhood variable that may control for
racial composition is a central city dummy. While it is possible that the premiums
estimated in earlier work were reversed in later years, it seems more likely that the
omission of controls for neighborhood racial composition have biased the results.
Other authors have attempted to combine the large and comprehensive data pro-
vided by the AHS with more stringent neighborhood controls. Chambers (1992) uses
special AHS data for Chicago that includes information on the characteristics of 24
zones that were made up of groups of census tracts. Kiel and Zabel (1996) use AHS
data for Chicago, Denver, and Philadelphia to isolate individual census tracts and
control for racial composition. Both studies demonstrate that the price discounts
estimated for blacks are greatly overstated when neighborhood racial composition
is not a control. Once a variable measuring the racial composition of neighborhoods
is introduced, Chambers estimates that the discount for renters disappears and the
discount for owners declines to 12 percent while Kiel and Zabel estimate that the
discount for owners decreases to 5 percent. However, Kiel and Zabel point out that
their census tract proxy is likely too broad to fully control for neighborhood char-
acteristics and suggest that more exact controls for a smaller area could possibly
eliminate the perceived discount altogether.
In fact, all of the recent literature on racial housing price differentials either has
no neighborhood controls or controls that researchers suspect are too broad. The
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smallest geographic area that has been used in recent research has been the census
tract and, as the authors themselves suggest, this is likely too large an area to be a
good proxy for neighborhood (Kiel and Zabel, 1996).
Thus far the literature discussed has focused on separating racial price differ-
entials into portions caused by discrimination, prejudice, and segregation. More
recent work has examined the sources of segregation, including discrimination and
prejudice. Cutler et al. (1999), use census data to show that segregation in the
United States declined between 1970 and 1990. The authors then compare how the
black/white differential in average prices for housing varies across cities as the level
of segregation varies. They find that earlier in the 20th century, blacks tended to
pay more in cities with higher levels of segregation. This indicated that segregation
was the result of discrimination or a preference on the part of blacks for segrega-
tion from whites. However, by 1970 the differential had decreased and by 1990 it
had reversed: blacks tend to pay less than whites for housing in more segregated
cities. This provides evidence that white prejudice (but not direct discriminatory
action) has replaced discrimination and/or black preferences as the driving force
behind segregation. This finding is supported by Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi (2002) who
use special survey data for Atlanta, Detroit, and Los Angeles to show that black
preferences for segregation do not explain a large portion of observed segregation.
However, it is important to note that Cutler et al. are using broad city-level mea-
sures of prices and segregation. In the event that the level of segregation in a city
is correlated with unobserved quality differences, the results will be biased. This is
troublesome because previous literature has already suggested that predominantly
black neighborhoods tend to have poor amenities relative to white neighborhoods.
So increases in segregation might be associated with decreased in housing quality
for blacks relative to whites.
Ross (2002) uses 1985 AHS data for the city of Philadelphia to examine choice of
community. He finds that differences in socio-economic characteristics and prefer-
ences for neighborhood amenities explain some of the racial differences in community
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choice and resulting segregation. However, a large portion of segregation is explained
by differences in how neighborhood racial composition affects the community choices
of whites and blacks. However, as Ross points out, it is unclear whether this is due
to racial differences in preferences for composition or due to discrimination that
limits available options.
In summary, the evidence that the discrimination premium paid by blacks has
declined and reversed may be tainted by omitted variable bias. However, evidence
on the causes of segregation does point to white prejudice, so it is not clear that
discrimination continues to play a role in housing markets. A better understanding
of the components of racial price differentials will help to identify and separate the
effects of discrimination, prejudice, and segregation.
3.4 Data
The American Housing Survey (AHS) has been conducted by the United States Cen-
sus Bureau for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) since
1973.5 The data are collected by interviewers who travel to each of approximately
55,000 housing units to ask questions about the characteristics of the housing unit
and occupants. The same address is visited each year until a new sample is drawn.
Hence the panel consists of observations of a housing unit over time, but the occu-
pants may change. Due to confidentiality restrictions, the public files of the AHS
do not reveal the geographic location of a unit below the MSA level. Therefore it
usually is not possible to generate information about the racial composition of the
neighborhood surrounding a household or other characteristics of the neighborhood
that are not included in the data.
The special neighbors samples taken in the 1985, 1989, and 1993 national AHS
provide an alternate proxy for neighborhood. In 1985 approximately 680 units
were sub sampled from the full AHS sample. These form the “kernel” units of
5Prior to 1984 the survey was known as the Annual Housing Survey.
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the neighbors sample. The 10 nearest neighbors of each kernel unit were then
also interviewed, and the kernel unit and its neighbors form a “cluster.” These
neighboring units had to be within a mile of the kernel unit and could not be
separated from it by a discontinuity such as a bridge, river, railroad tracks, interstate
highway, etc.6 Hence, in the case of a relatively densely populated area, the ten
nearest houses are observed but, if a kernel unit is more remote from neighboring
houses, there may be fewer than ten neighboring units. In 1989 and 1993 most
of the clusters from 1985 were re-interviewed and new clusters also were added in
each year. In addition, if new housing was added through construction or some
other means to the geographic area that had comprised the original cluster, the new
housing was added to the interview. Hence, in 1989 and 1993 some of the clusters
contain more than 11 housing units.
In the data used in this study, there are 648 to 936 clusters in each year.7 The
clusters, with an average of 9.6 houses and 26 inhabitants, are considerably smaller
both in area and population than census tracts or groups of census tracts. Every
household within a neighborhood cluster is considered part of the sample and I use
the average characteristics of the cluster to which each household belongs to proxy
for neighborhood characteristics.8 The total sample consists of 21,712 observations
of housing units of which approximately 13,000 are owner-occupied and 8,500 are
rented.
The racial characteristics used here are what the interviewee (“reference person”)
reports for him or herself. The reference person could classify himself as white, black,
6Thanks to Barbara T. Williams of the U.S. Census Bureau for information on the neighbors
sample.
7Any observations that both were not owned and reported no cash rent were dropped. Obser-
vations that did not report the race of the inhabitants, were non-interviews because the unit was
vacant or for other reasons, or were part of a cluster with less than five houses also were dropped.
8The kernel unit is usually roughly at the center of the cluster. Therefore, the characteristics of
the cluster may be a better proxy for the surroundings of the kernel unit than for the surroundings
of other units in the cluster. For this reason, it would be ideal to only include observations on
kernel units in the analysis, but, because the resulting sample size would be very small, all units
are in fact included in the sample. However, because the cluster is a small area, it seems likely that
the characteristics of the cluster are acceptable proxies for the neighborhood surrounding all units
in the cluster.
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or other, with other including American Indian, Chinese, Korean, etc.. Note that
these classifications are strictly based on the respondent’s perception of his own
race, and not on ethnicity. Therefore, black Hispanics should fall into the category
“black,” white Hispanics should fall into the category “white,” and Hispanic of native
American origins should fall into the category “other.” Although it is possible to
identify Hispanics in the data, the distinction is not used here. Race and ethnicity
are certainly nebulous and changing concepts and there is room for debate and
interpretation of to what group a person belongs. However, for the purposes of this
paper, we are concerned strictly with race and do not add the complication of trying
to separate ethnicity. There is also the implicit assumption that it is to what group
the respondent believes he or she belongs that determines his race.
Neighborhood Characteristics and Definitions
The AHS includes several questions about neighborhood quality. Respondents are
asked if crime is a problem and if there is something bothersome about the neigh-
borhood. The enumerator also records observations about the surrounding of a
unit including nearby abandoned structures and bars on the windows of nearby
houses. The averages of observations of these characteristics are constructed for
each neighborhood as measures of amenity levels. Because there are many missing
observations for some of the neighborhood quality variables, only indicators of neigh-
borhood problems, crime, bars on windows, and abandoned houses are used in later
regressions. Variables that control for neighborhood quality are also constructed us-
ing the characteristics of houses within the cluster. The median household income,
median number of years of education of the reference people in a cluster, and the
percents of black, white, and other inhabitants in a cluster are calculated.
Once respondents are classified according to race and the racial composition
of each neighborhood is measured, each neighborhood is further classified by sub-
market as a “white neighborhood”, “black neighborhood”, or an “integrated neigh-
borhood.” A complication in this classification is how to treat the racial group
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“other,” which makes up just under 4 percent of the total sample. This chapter is
primarily concerned with the outcomes of blacks relative to non-blacks. Therefore,
others and whites are combined and white neighborhoods are composed of at least 85
percent white and other households (15 percent or less black), black neighborhoods
are composed of at least 30 percent black households, and integrated neighborhoods
are composed of between 15 and 30 percent black households.9, 10 These neighbor-
hood definitions were selected to be similar to the definitions used in the previous
literature, which tend to define black neighborhoods at a relatively lower black con-
centration than the white concentration used to delimit a white neighborhood. In
addition, when the fully specified hedonic regressions used in the econometric anal-
ysis were run with all possible combinations of cutoff levels for neighborhood types
(in increments of 5 percentage points), the levels that minimized the sum of squared
errors were near the levels used here. However, the cutoff levels that resulted in
the lowest sum of squared errors defined integrated neighborhoods as having only
5 to 10 percent black, which was too narrow a band to be useful for analysis. The
sum of squared errors of the specification used here is close to that minimum and
the definitions in use allow a broader range of racial composition within integrated
neighborhoods.
While census tracts and larger areas are likely too-broad proxies for neighbor-
hood, there is some danger that using clusters as neighborhood proxies goes too
far in the other direction. There is a particularly large chance of misclassifying an
integrated neighborhood because the boundaries of such a neighborhood are nar-
row. There is also more error for neighborhoods that are near the boundaries for
their classification, such as a white neighborhood with 14 percent black inhabitants.
This problem could introduce error to the coefficients on neighborhood type which
help to measure the effects of exclusion. However, this problem is likely less severe
than that introduced by using proxies that are too large and hence not homogenous
9The outcomes reported are not greatly different if blacks and others are combined instead.
10Note that the race of the reference person is used to measure the race of the household
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because the these can introduce bias to all of the racial coefficients of interest.
Rent and Value
Measurements of rent and value also merit special attention. Rent is the respon-
dent’s report of monthly contract rent. It is a direct measure of what renters pay for
housing. Value, on the other hand, is the owner’s estimate of the fair market value
of his or her home. It is possible that people incorrectly estimate the values of their
homes. But, Kiel and Zabel (1999) have shown that while people do tend to overes-
timate the value of their homes, there is no evidence that one group tends to have
any greater bias in their estimates than another. The only exception to this is that
new home owners tend to overstate the value more than those who have owned the
home for a while. Therefore, once length of tenure is controlled for, overestimates of
value should not bias the results since respondents tend to uniformly overestimate
fair market value.
Sample Characteristics by Race
Table 3.1 reports average characteristics of the housing, neighborhoods, and house-
holds of black, white, and other respondents. Note that since the neighborhood
characteristics are constructed by averaging the characteristics of houses and house-
holds within the neighborhood, these figures are means of means and medians.
The differences in neighborhood characteristics across races are striking. Relative
to whites, black respondents tend to live in neighborhoods with more abandoned
houses, more crime, and more respondents reporting that something is bothersome
about the neighborhood. Although 13 percent of the sample is composed of black
reference people, blacks also tend to live in neighborhoods that are 74 percent black
and whites tend to live in neighborhoods that are only 4 percent black. Not sur-
prisingly, black respondents people tend to live in black neighborhoods. 84 percent
of black respondents live in black neighborhoods while only 8 percent live in white
neighborhoods. This evidence that blacks tend to live near other blacks and that
the neighborhoods that they live in have different characteristics than the neighbor-
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Median house value 60, 000 90, 000 190, 000
Median Rent 349 451 523
Mean number rooms 5.15 5.56 5.20
Mean unit square feet 1372 1637 1515
Neighborhood
Percent living in black neighborhoods 84.07 3.42 9.66
Percent living in white neighborhoods 7.95 92.25 83.09
Percent living in integrated neighborhoods 7.98 4.33 7.25
Mean percent black in neighborhood** 74.15 3.78 8.12
Median income in neighborhood 23, 848 36, 648 36, 681
Median years of education in neighborhood 11.87 13.05 12.72
Mean pct of houses in neighborhood with reports of:
bad crime 30.75 17.89 25.31
nearby abandoned structures 17.31 3.21 4.78
something bothersome about neighborhood 47.66 40.60 46.03
Household
Percent married 35.66 54.79 58.21
Percent male 46.10 66.21 67.15
Mean age 47.54 49.55 43.92
Median household income 19, 000 30, 814 31, 448
Mean number of occupants 2.73 2.52 3.46
Number observations 2894 77, 990 828
*All monetary values are 1993 dollars.
**13 percent of sample is black.
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hoods that whites live in reinforces the idea that it is necessary to control carefully
for neighborhood when estimating racial price differentials.
3.5 Econometric Model
A hedonic housing price regression is used to examine how various factors affect
equilibrium prices. Because demand and supply are not separately identified, it is
only economic theory that leads to conclusions about the sources of different types
of differentials. The reduced form regression for owners, including all racial variables
and neighborhood characteristics, is
ln(valueit) = δ + Xitβ + αbblackit + αootherit + δihinthoodit + δbhbhoodit
+γpwpctb whoodit + γpipctb inthoodit + γpbpctb bhoodit
+γopctotherit + υit
(3.1)
where Xit is a vector of characteristics of the house, neighborhood, and reference
person, excluding the racial variables that are of particular interest in this case.
Xit includes such variables as number of rooms and age of house and the marital
status of the reference person. The remaining variables are the racial variables that
identify the effects of supplier discrimination, prejudice, and exclusion. A description
of all the variables included in the hedonic regressions appears in the appendix; a
more detailed summary of the racial and neighborhood variables that are of special
interest appears in Table 3.2. The regression for renters uses the natural logarithm
of rent as a dependent variable and a few additional variables that account for rent
control status and other factors.
The Racial Variables
The racial variables can be thought of as terms in a racial price gradient which
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Table 3.2: Racial and Neighborhood Variables
Variable Description Range
black I(race = black) {0,1}
other I(race = other) {0, 1}
pctblack % of houses in neighborhood with
black reference person
[0,100]
whood I(pctblack ≤ 15) {0, 1}
bhood I(pctblack ≥ 30) {0, 1}
inthood I(15 < pblack < 30) {0, 1}
pctb whood pctblack ∗ whood {0, 1}
pctb bhood pctblack ∗ bhood {0, 1}
pctb inthood pctblack ∗ inthood {0, 1}
mbcrime % of respondents in neighborhood re-
porting bad crime in neighborhood
[0, 100]
maban % of houses in neighborhood with
abandoned houses nearby
[0, 100]
mproblems % of respondents in neighborhood
reporting something about neighbor-
hood is bothersome
[0, 100]
mbar % of houses in neighborhood with bars
on nearby buildings
[0, 100]
lmedzinc natural logarithm of median neighbor-
hood income
[7.3, 11.8]
mededuc median years of education in neighbor-
hood
{1, 2, ..., 18}
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Figure 3.1: Example of Racial Price Gradient
measures how prices change as racial composition changes. Because the regression
is a log-linear model, the coefficients on the racial terms measure relative changes in
prices from what would be observed in a neighborhood with no black inhabitants.
Figure 3.1 represents a racial price-gradient as a function of the coefficients of inter-
est. The y-axis measures the percent deviation in house values or rents from those
values in a neighborhood with no blacks. Within white neighborhoods, where the
percentage of blacks inhabitants is less than or equal to 15 percent, a one percentage
point increase in the percentage of black inhabitants will change prices by 100γpw
percent. Similarly, γpi and γpb measure how prices change in integrated and black
neighborhoods as the percentage of black inhabitants changes within in each neigh-
borhood. If prejudice is a factor in the market, then one expects these coefficients to
be negative since increasing numbers of black inhabitants in a neighborhood would
decrease housing prices there.
The dummy variables for neighborhood type, δih and δbh, allow prices to jump
between neighborhoods as exclusionary theories suggest might happen. For in-
stance, as the percentage of blacks in a neighborhood increases to just over 15,
the neighborhood will change from being defined as a white neighborhood to be-
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ing defined as an integrated neighborhood. In a white neighborhood with 15 per-
cent black inhabitants, the percent deviation in value from that if there were no
blacks is 100(15γpw). As the percentage black in an integrated neighborhood ap-
proaches 15 from above, the limiting percent deviation in value from that in a
white neighborhood with no blacks is 100(δih + 15γpi). The difference in these
values, TIPI = 100[δih + 15(γpi − γpw)], measures the change in the percent devi-
ation in prices as a neighborhood changes from the lower limit of an integrated
neighborhood to the upper limit of a white neighborhood. If segregation pre-
vents blacks from moving into white areas and population pressures exert upward
pressure on prices in black neighborhoods, this value will be positive. Similarly,
TIPB = 100[(δbh−δih)+30(γpb−γpi)] measures how the percent deviation in prices
changes from the lower limit of a black neighborhood to the upper limit of an inte-
grated neighborhood. These variables are denoted “TIP” in keeping with Kiel and
Zabel (1996) and the literature that suggests that at a certain threshold point of the
proportion of blacks in a neighborhood, the neighborhood type and, possibly, house
prices suddenly shift. In this case the threshold points, 15 and 30 percent, shift the
neighborhood types from white to integrated and integrated to black, respectively.
Finally, the coefficients on black and other are parameters that allow the racial
price gradient to shift within any neighborhood according to the race of the owner
or renter. The coefficient on black should capture supplier price discrimination
because it measures how prices vary for blacks relative to whites for the same housing
services.
Random vs. Fixed Effects
Although previous authors have used data from the American Housing Survey, they
have not taken advantage of the time series characteristics of the data. Because
the data form an unbalanced panel, it is possible to test for correlation between
the error term and dependent variables, a concern that, as has been discussed, is of
particular importance in the case of racial price differentials.
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Table 3.3: Within Changes in Racial Variables
No. of observations No. of observations






pctb whood 653 706
pctb bhood 346 335
pctb inthood 48 58
The consistency of both OLS and Random Effects methods depends crucially
on υit being uncorrelated with the regressors. In the case that the error term is
uncorrelated with the regressors, both OLS and Random Effects models will yield
consistent results, but random effects will be more efficient. However, a priori
it seems unlikely that this assumption will hold. Even with some neighborhood
controls and controls for many of the characteristics of housing, there are certainly
unobserved factors such as the proximity of a neighborhood to commercial centers
and the design of a house that are omitted in this and other analyses. And since
one suspects that many neighborhood characteristics are correlated with race, there
is no reason to think that the neighborhood characteristics that are still omitted do
not suffer from this problem. It is also plausible that unobserved characteristics of
the house are correlated with race. For instance, perhaps blacks not only tend to live
in neighborhoods with lower amenity levels, but they also tend to live in houses that
are not built or designed well. So, while random effects models will be estimated
and are of particular importance for comparison to the OLS models that previous
authors have used, the results are suspect even before a Hausman specification test
is performed.
Fixed effects models, however, offer the well-known trade off of being consistent
in the presence of correlation between the error term and regressors but of relying on
differences in the regressors across time for each observation. Table 3.3 summarizes
the number of changes observed for certain racial and neighborhood characteristics.
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The neighborhood variables tend to have several hundred observations that change,
increasing the likelihood that the coefficients on these variables can be estimated
with some precision. However, there are only 84 observations of addresses with a
change in the race of the owners from non-black to black or from black to non-black.
This lack of variation suggests that the estimated coefficients are likely to have large
standard errors and that it may not be possible to precisely estimate the coefficients
that indicate supplier discrimination. On the other hand, the observations that we
do have offer what may be the best way to capture supplier discrimination—by
comparing how house values and rents change when the race of the inhabitants of a
particular dwelling changes.
3.6 Estimates and Results
Various random effects specifications were considered in order to examine how the
inclusion of neighborhood controls affects estimates of racial price differentials. Ta-
ble 3.4 presents a comparison of racial and neighborhood coefficients in random
effects models as differing levels of neighborhood controls are added.11 Specifica-
tion 1, similar to that used by Follain and Malpezzi (1981), includes no neighborhood
controls. The highly significant estimates of the coefficients on black indicate that
black owners live in homes that have 23 percent lower values than those of whites
and that black renters pay 8.3 percent less rent. These results are similar to those
obtained by other authors when no neighborhood controls are in place and are not
surprising given the correlation between blacks living in neighborhoods with lower
amenity levels. Specification 2 demonstrates that when controls for the racial com-
position and neighborhood category are added, the coefficients on race dummies
become insignificant and the estimates indicate that an increase in the black pop-
ulation in any given neighborhood results in a decrease in house values. However,
11Complete regression results, including coefficients on the variables included in the vector X,
which are listed in the appendix, are available upon request. Only the neighborhood and racial
variables of interested are presented here.
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when controls are added for non-racial neighborhood characteristics such as crime,
the coefficients on neighborhood racial characteristics decrease in magnitude, as
shown in Specification 3, which is considered the “full” specification.
The results in Table 3.4 demonstrate that once neighborhood characteristics are
controlled for as completely as possible, the estimated racial price differentials (the
coefficients on black and other), which were large and negative in specifications
without neighborhood controls, become insignificant for both owners and renters.12
This finding supports the assertion of Kiel and Zabel (1996) that smaller geographic
proxies for neighborhood may increase the estimated differential from the negative
estimates that have been found in recent literature.
The results of the full random effects specification indicate that blacks do not
pay different prices from non-blacks for either housing type. They do, however, sup-
port the hypothesis that prejudice causes both values and rents to decline in some
neighborhoods as the percent of blacks increases. They also indicate that exclusion
may drive up house values in black neighborhoods. These results are compara-
ble to earlier research that has used OLS to estimate similar hedonic regressions.
However, the use of panel data in this chapter offers the added ability to use a
Hausman specification test to test the null hypothesis that the error component is
not correlated with the regressors. Not surprisingly, the test statistic for the first
specification, which has no neighborhood controls, is large and the null hypothesis
can be rejected. However, even when neighborhood characteristics are controlled for
as thoroughly as possible, the Hausman test statistic remains large and the null can
be readily rejected. This result not only indicates that the coefficients in this ran-
dom effects specification are biased and inconsistent, but that the coefficients in the
OLS specifications used by other authors, even those that control for neighborhood
characteristics, are likely to be biased and inconsistent as well.
12Note that in the specifications discussed, the effect of the reference person’s race is not interacted
with neighborhood type. A more flexible model interacts race with neighborhood type so that the
effects of supplier discrimination would be allowed to vary across neighborhoods. However, in all of
the specifications discussed, when race was interacted with neighborhood type, the null hypothesis
that the coefficients were equal could never be rejected.
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Table 3.4: Select Random Effects Estimates
Owners Renters
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Coefficients
mbcrime - - -0.0003 - - 0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0003)
maban - - -0.0013 - - -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0002)
mproblems - - -0.0008 - - 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002)
mbar - - 0.0007 - - 0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0002)
lmedzinc - - 0.3292 - - 0.2410
(0.0142) (0.0118)
mededuc - - 0.0288 - - 0.0180
(0.0034) (0.0029)
black -0.2276 0.0276 0.0235 -0.0831 0.0129 0.0017
(0.0212) (0.0341) (0.0325) (0.0150) (0.0220) (0.0212)
other 0.2205 0.0549 0.0401 0.0894 0.0290 0.0192
(0.0351) (0.0394) (0.0378) (0.0225) (0.0262) (0.0254)
bhood - -0.0276 -0.0004 - 0.0706 0.0534
(0.0605) (0.0590) (0.0366) (0.0354)
inthood - 0.2888 0.2391 - 0.0485 -0.0262
(0.1358) (0.1328) (0.1078) (0.1060)
pctb bhood - -0.0037 -0.0031 - -0.0026 -0.0016
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005)
pctb inthood - -0.0193 -0.0158 - -0.0032 0.0005
(0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0049) (0.0048)
pctb whood - -0.0092 -0.0009 - -0.0023 -0.0018
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0014)
pctother - 0.0073 0.0007 - 0.0025 -0.0024
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Estimates
TIPi - 0.1372 0.1380 - 0.0349 0.0082
(0.0529) (0.0515) (0.0414) (0.0408)
TIPb - 0.1530 0.1480 - 0.0409 0.0165
(0.0664) (0.0655) (0.0488) (0.0476)
Hausman test
statistic 742.4 1087.2 623.2 566.6 554.6 425.2
*Dep. var.: ln(value) for owners and ln(rent) for renters. Coefficients in bold
are significant at the 10% level.
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As discussed previously, an address-specific fixed effects estimator will be un-
biased and consistent in the presence of such correlation, although low variation
in some variables may lead to imprecise estimates.13 The fixed effects estimates
for Specifications 3, the “full” specification, appear in Table 3.5. The fixed effects
standard errors are robust to possible spatial correlation within a neighborhood in
a given year. Despite concerns about low variation of many of these variables, the
estimates indicate significant racial differentials for owners (but not for renters).
When the full controls for neighborhood characteristics are included, the fixed ef-
fects estimate for owners of the coefficient on black is both positive and significant
at the ten percent level. It indicates that blacks pay approximately 10 percent more
than whites for identical housing in identical neighborhoods, providing evidence of
supplier discrimination. Although this coefficient becomes significant only at the 10
percent level, it is measuring how values changed for a given house when the race
of the occupants changed, which is exactly what we wish to capture. The positive
value of this coefficient in the fixed effects model indicates that correlation between
the black dummy and error term continued to exert downward bias in the random
effects model even with neighborhood controls in place. This offers evidence that
supplier price discrimination may still be a force in the ownership market but that it
hasn’t been reliably captured in previous studies because of bias caused by omitted
neighborhood effects.
The estimates also provide evidence that prejudice causes house prices to fall
as the percent of blacks in a neighborhood increases. The coefficient on racial
composition in integrated neighborhoods is negative, but with a p-value of .107 is
insignificant. However, the estimates indicate that a 10 percentage point increase
13Another possibility would be to incorporate neighborhood fixed effects rather than address fixed
effects. However, Hausman-type specification tests of neighborhood fixed effects versus address
fixed effects indicated that correlation was still a problem for all of the models estimated when just
using neighborhood-level fixed effects. Another model that would not suffer from problems induced
by correlation is a Hausman-Taylor IV random effects model. However, this requires assumptions
about which variables are correlated with the error term and requires a certain number of regressors
that are not correlated with the error term. There are not many likely regressor candidates that
are uncorrelated and when the author tried such a model, specification tests continued to indicate
that correlation was a problem.
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Table 3.5: Select Fixed Effects Estimates
Owners Renters
(3) (4) (5) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficients
mbcrime -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
maban -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
mproblems -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
mbar 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0016 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
lmedzinc 0.0603 0.0615 0.0616 0.0909 0.0843 0.0888
(0.0328) (0.0327) (0.0326) (0.0324) (0.0327) (0.0323)
mededuc -0.0042 -0.0049 -0.0048 0.0014 0.0021 0.0026
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0071)
black 0.1038 0.1028 0.1023 0.0241 0.0225 0.0229
(0.0589) (0.0592) (0.0592) (0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0371)
other 0.0225 0.0229 0.0235 0.0410 0.0404 0.0396
(0.0853) (0.0852) (0.0853) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302)
bhood 0.1006 - - -0.1579 - -
(0.1616) - - (0.1013) - -
inthood 0.3591 - - -0.0165 - -
(0.2422) - - (0.1885) - -
pctb bhood -0.0048 - - 0.0022 - -
(0.0028) - - (0.0022) - -
pctb inthood -0.0169 - - -0.0034 - -
(0.0105) - - (0.0084) - -
pctb whood -0.0071 - - -0.0014 - -
(0.0032) - - (0.0027) - -
pctblack - -0.0033 -0.0031 - -0.006 -0.0039
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0018)
pctblack2 - - 0.0000 - - 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000)
pctother 0.0029 0.0030 0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0006
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0019)
pctother2 - - 0.0000 - - 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Estimates of TIP
TIPi 0.2128 - - -0.0470 - -
(0.1035) (0.0722)
TIPb 0.1045 - - 0.0263 - -
(0.0980) (0.0822)
*Dep. var.: ln(value) for owners and ln(rent) for renters. Coefficients in bold are signifi-
cant at the 10% level.
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in pctblack lowers house values in black neighborhoods by an average of 4.8 percent
and lowers values in white neighborhoods by an average of 7.1 percent. The null
hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal can be readily rejected with a p-value
of 0.006. The results indicate that the impact of racial composition is larger in white
neighborhoods than in black neighborhoods. However, without interacting the effect
of racial composition it is not possible to say whether this is because of differences
in black and white preferences for racial composition or due to differences in the
preferences of inhabitants of the two neighborhood types in general.
The estimates of the tipping points are also of interest. Although T̂ IPB is not
significant, T̂ IP I = .2128 and is significant with a p-value of .040. This indicates
that as the percentage of blacks moves just above 30, causing a neighborhood to
“tip” from integrated to black, there is not a jump in prices. However, as the
percentage of blacks moves just above 15, causing a neighborhood to “tip” from
white to integrated, the estimated increase in value is 21.3 percent with a 95 percent
confidence interval of [.99031, 41.6] percent. Although the estimate of the change
in value between white and integrated neighborhoods is imprecise, perhaps due to
higher error in categorizing integrated neighborhoods with current sample sizes, it
does provide evidence that exclusion from white neighborhoods may keep prices high
in neighborhoods with blacks. However, the source of the exclusion is not identified
in this model.
Figure 3.2 represents the fixed effects estimates of the percent deviation in house
values from those in an all white neighborhood as a function of racial composition.
The negative slopes for all neighborhood types reflects declining prices as blacks
move in. The point estimates indicate that the effect of an increase in blacks on
neighborhood prices is lower in black neighborhoods than in white ones. Again,
the jump in the gradient between white and integrated neighborhoods is evidence
that exclusion keeps prices lower in non-black neighborhoods. The entire gradient
is shifted upward by 10 percentage points for black buyers.
The results indicate that supplier discrimination causes blacks to pay more for
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Figure 3.2: Estimated Racial Value Gradient
housing than whites but that prejudice causes housing prices to fall as the percent
of blacks in a neighborhood rises. To judge whether blacks pay more or less than
whites overall for housing, consider that the average white in the sample lives in
a neighborhood that is 3.78 percent black and 2.62 percent other and the average
black lives in a neighborhood that is 74.15 percent black and 2.32 percent other.
Evaluating the explanatory variables X at a set level, Equation 2 shows the difference
in predicted average prices paid for housing by whites in their typical neighborhoods
( ̂valuew) and blacks in their typical neighborhoods( ̂valueb)holding all non-racial
variables constant:
ln( ̂valuew) − ln( ̂valueb) =
[3.78γ̂pw + 2.62γ̂o] − [α̂b + δ̂bh + 74.15γ̂pb + 2.32γ̂o]. (3.2)
Plugging in the coefficient estimates, the results indicate that the value of an
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average home occupied by a white in his typical neighborhood is 13.3 percent higher
than the value of an average home occupied by a black in his typical neighborhood.
If discrimination were not present (that is, if α̂b equalled zero), then whites would
pay 26 percent more on average for housing than blacks because houses in their
predominantly white neighborhoods have a higher value.
The fixed effects results for renters do not provide similar evidence of discrimina-
tion or prejudice. In fact, all of the coefficients on the racial terms are insignificant
in the fully specified fixed effects model. This may be because racial differentials are
not present in the rental market or it may be due to correlation between race and
rent assistance programs. Although variables such as rent control, public housing,
and rent assistance are included, it is possible that error in reporting these or error
in calculating rent (which should not include any assistance) lead to poor estimates.
Another source of concern lies in the choosing of neighborhood boundaries. Di-
viding the neighborhoods into three categories allows for an attempt to identify
the effects of segregation. It also allows the price gradient to be estimated as a
spline function so that the effect of racial composition can be different within the
three categories. However, as discussed in the data section, the small neighborhood
proxies may result in large error in assigning neighborhood types, especially for the
relatively narrow integrated neighborhood category. Specification 4 removes the
neighborhood type variables and their interactions, leaving only a variable measur-
ing the race of the reference person and the racial composition of the neighborhood.
The results for owners indicate that a 10 percent increase in the percent or neigh-
borhood inhabitants who are black is associated with an average decrease in house
values of 3 percent. Specification 5 adds a quadratic term for racial composition
to provide more flexibility. Unfortunately, combining a quadratic term with a fixed
effects estimate may require more variation across time than is observed in the
data. The coefficients on the racial composition terms for owners are insignificant.
Interestingly, the results for renters are significant. The estimates indicate that as
the percentage of blacks in a neighborhood increases, rents decline at a decreasing
64
rate. The coefficient on the racial dummy does not change much with the different
specifications.
3.7 Conclusion
Although the estimates indicate that prejudice, exclusion, and supplier price dis-
crimination all play roles in the housing market for owners, several improvements
would make the results more robust. First of all, the neighborhood proxies used
here may fall at the other end of the spectrum from those used in previous research:
rather than being too broad, they may be too narrow. Neighborhood proxies at a
level such as a census block or block group (which are smaller than census tracts and
larger than the ten nearest neighbors) might both be more uniform in characteristics
and have large enough sample size to decrease the error in categorizing sub-markets.
This, in turn, would make the estimates of the change in prices between neighbor-
hood less subject to error. Secondly, a larger sample would increase the precision of
the fixed effects estimator because one would expect to see more change in the race
of households.
However, despite these limitations, the data used in this research have yielded
several key findings. First, they provide more evidence supporting the important
role of neighborhood characteristics in housing services. As has been observed in
previous studies, the estimated difference in housing prices paid by blacks decreases
in magnitude as neighborhood characteristics are added to the random effects he-
donic regression. Moreover, by using a smaller geographic proxy for neighborhood
than previous researchers, such differentials become insignificant once neighborhood
effects are incorporated. This suggests that previous negative differentials may have
been biased in part due to neighborhood controls that were too broad. The use of
the smaller geographic proxy for neighborhood also allows for better estimates of
how non-racial neighborhood characteristics affect housing prices.
Secondly, although the random effects results offer interesting comparisons to
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previous studies, Hausman specification tests indicate that even with controls for
neighborhood amenities such as racial composition, income levels, education, crime,
and abandoned houses, there is still correlation between the regressors and the
unobserved address-specific error term. This suggests that not only might these
results be biased, but that the OLS results in previous studies, which tended to use
broader neighborhood controls, are also likely to suffer from bias.
Finally, fixed effects estimates provide evidence of racial price differentials in the
ownership market. House values fall as the percent of blacks in a neighborhood rises,
indicating that high concentrations of blacks may be perceived as a neighborhood
disamenity by some consumers. Furthermore, although there is no evidence of sup-
plier price discrimination in the random effects estimates, the fixed effects estimates,
which should be unbiased and consistent, provide evidence that black homeowners
in any neighborhood pay 10 percent more for their homes than white homeowners.
This suggests that previous biased results may have falsely indicated no supplier
discrimination against blacks. That this finding is so different from the findings in
other research only further emphasizes the importance of the relationship between
neighborhood effects and race.
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Chapter 4
A Cure for Discrimination?
Affirmative Action and the Case
of Proposition 209
4.1 Introduction
Introducing and removing affirmative action are not opposite sides of the same coin.
Proponents of affirmative action maintain that it will provide a long-term cure
for discrimination by allowing victims to demonstrate their skill and worth, thus
changing prejudicial attitudes. Under this scenario, if affirmative action “works,”
then when it is time to get rid of the program there will be no deleterious effects for
minorities. Opponents of these controversial programs, however, argue that it does
not address the root source of inequality and, moreover, that it may create labor
market inefficiencies and result in reverse discrimination against white males. Both
sides, therefore, suggest that an effective affirmative action program would cause
minority employment to rise, but they disagree on whether this increase is efficient
and whether it would be sustainable if formal affirmative action were ended.
To date, there has been little opportunity to measure empirically the impact of
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removing affirmative action programs. While federal support for enforcement has
ebbed and flowed and Supreme Court rulings in the past decade have chipped away
at affirmative action, it is difficult to say whether concurrent changes in minority
outcomes were due to affirmative action policy or other trends in inequality. A
similar problem plagued attempts to measure the impact of instituting affirmative
action in earlier years. While minorities and women made gains in the labor market
in the seventies and eighties, it is not clear what portion of this was due to affir-
mative action and what was the result of other influences. Empirical studies of the
impact of affirmative action on labor markets have relied on differences in outcomes
for government contractors, who are subject to the program, and non-contractors,
who are not. While these studies have provided evidence of minority gains among
contracting firms, the results could be biased because contractor status is not ex-
ogenous: firms with the lowest cost of meeting affirmative actions requirements may
be more likely to be contractors. Hence, we are left with an incomplete picture of
both the impact of a controversial program and the potential consequences of its
removal. What is needed, essentially, is a control group to which we can compare
changes in outcomes for those affected by affirmative action.
The enactment of California Proposition 209 provides just such an opportunity.
The measure, passed in the 1996 state elections and made effective in November
of 1997, essentially outlawed existing local and state affirmative action programs in
education, public hiring, and contracting, unless superseded by federal law. This
change in state policy presents a natural experiment for measuring the labor market
impact of removing of affirmative action programs. I use Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) data to compare outcomes for minorities in California before and after
affirmative action was removed to those same outcomes for white males. Then, to
control for national trends in minority differentials, I compare this difference to the
difference for a control group: states not undergoing similar changes in the law.
The use of this triple difference technique to analyze the impact of removing affir-
mative action on employment, unemployment, labor force participation, and wages
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will provide evidence on the long-term effects of affirmative action.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, I provide
an overview of affirmative action policy and its impacts and a description of the
gaps that this analysis can help to fill. In Section 3, I describe and summarize the
data. Section 4 presents the econometric model and Section 5 describes the results.
Section 6 provides a summary of findings and conclusions.
4.2 The history and consequences of affirmative action
policy
National legislation and impacts
Whereas equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act prohibit discrimination, affirmative action legislation goes further by
requiring that proactive steps be undertaken to remedy inequalities produced by
past discrimination. In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246,
the primary regulation governing affirmative action, which requires that federal
contractors “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” Under its provisions, federal contractors must
provide written affirmative action plans, progress reports, and submit to government
compliance reviews. While EO 11246 only directly affected federal contractors, many
state and local agencies and non-contractor private businesses voluntarily adopted
similar programs in an attempt to address discrimination and avoid litigation under
equal employment laws (Thomas and Garrett, 1999).
Early studies tend to indicate that affirmative action had a positive impact on
the employment and occupational advancement of racial minorities.1 Because of the
inherent difficulty in separating gains from affirmative action from general trends in
1For a survey of the literature on affirmative action, see Holzer and Neumark (2000a).
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racial inequality, these studies rely on data from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to compare outcomes for firms that are federal contractors,
and hence subject to federal affirmative action programs, with firms that are not.
Ashenfelter and Heckman (1976) find that the demand for black males increased
3.3 percent more among contractors than non-contractors between 1966 and 1970.
While they find similar employment gains for black males during the early seventies,
Heckman and Wolpin (1976) and Goldstein and Smith (1976) find no improvement or
even declines in employment for females at contractor establishments. However, as
Leonard (1989) points out, affirmative action for women did not become stringently
enforced until after the Equal Employment Act of 1972.
Studies of affirmative action in the late seventies and beyond tended again to
find positive employment gains for racial minorities and additional, although smaller,
gains for white females. Leonard (1984c) finds that between 1974 and 1980, con-
tractor demand for black males grew 3.8 percent faster, demand for other minority
males grew 7.9 percent faster, and the demand for white females grew 2.8 percent
faster than that of non-contractors. Leonard (1984b) also finds that affirmative
action appeared to have a relatively greater impact on minorities in skilled occu-
pational groups, although Smith and Welch (1984) suggest that observed gains in
occupational status may be due to contractors re-classifying jobs rather than to
any real upward mobility. Rodgers and Spriggs (1996) find that the positive im-
pact on employment continued through to 1992 for all groups except Hispanics, for
whom they find a negative impact. Holzer and Neumark (2000b) have one of the
few empirical studies with wide scope that does not depend on EEOC data. Using
information from a survey of employers in four U.S. cities, they find that firms that
use affirmative action do tend to recruit and hire more minorities and women. In
fact, contrary to most earlier results, the use of affirmative action in hiring seems
to have the largest effect for white women. For firms that report using affirmative
action in hiring, the last employee hired is 8 percent more likely to be a white woman
and 3 percent more likely to be a black man.
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Benefits through employment gains and occupational advance, however, may
mask underlying losses in efficiency. While the effects of affirmative action on mar-
ket efficiency are not fully understood,2 what evidence is present does not seem to
suggest large declines in productivity. Leonard (1984a) combines EEOC data with
industry level data and finds no evidence of lower productivity among federal con-
tractors. In their study, Holzer and Neumark (2000b) find that while minorities and
women hired under affirmative action appear to have lower readily observable qual-
ifications, their employers do not report significantly lower performance for these
groups than for white males. The authors suggest that this is the result of more
intensive screening and training programs.
California legislation and impacts
While empirical studies have tended to focus on national legislation, state govern-
ments have also instituted equal employment laws and affirmative action programs.
In 1959, five years before the passage of the federal Civil Rights Act, California
passed the Fair Employment Practices Act, which outlawed discrimination in that
state and created the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) (later given
responsibility for housing as well and re-named the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission) to enforce the act. The FEPC was also granted the power to “en-
gage in affirmative action with owners” in order to remedy discrimination (State of
California). In practice, the FEPC has been responsible for oversight of affirmative
action plans for state contracts over $200,000. In addition, in 1974 California be-
gan requiring all public agencies to submit affirmative action reports to the State
Personnel Board (SPB), which was responsible for the oversight and development of
public affirmative action programs(Thomas and Garrett, 1999). In 1989 California
established contracting set asides for minority and women-owned business, requiring
that at least 15 percent of the total value of state contracts go to minority-owned
businesses and 5 percent to women- owned businesses. So, prior to 1997, not only
were federal employers and contractors in California subject to mandated affirmative
2Holzer and Neumark (2000a) suggest that this is an important area for future research
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action programs, but so were all public employees and state contractors.
However, attacks on these state programs in the mid 1990’s have resulted in their
formal dismantling. In 1995, then-governor Pete Wilson signed Executive Order 124-
95, which directed state agencies to eliminate preferential treatments that exceed
federal or state statutory requirements. Legally this could only apply to pre-standing
executive orders and thus should not have affected state affirmative action laws, but
it is not clear, in practice, what effect it would have (Thomas and Garrett, 1999). A
year later, California voters passed Proposition 209 outlawing all state affirmative
action programs and hence releasing public employers as well as state contractors
from affirmative action requirements. After lengthy court challenges, the new law
went into effect in November, 1997.
While there has been a flurry of research on the impacts of Propositon 209 on
higher education in California, economists have neglected to pay attention to the
corresponding impacts on labor markets. Yet, given that 8 percent of California’s
work force is in the non-federal public sector3 and nearly 15 percent of California
small businesses claim California state and local governments as clients (Williams,
1999), we might expect Proposition 209 to affect more than educational institutions.
On the other hand, Holzer and Neumark (1999) suggest that approximately 60
percent of firms are federal contractors and subject of federal affirmative action
policy. So, while Proposition 209 is likely to have had an effect on public employers
in California, it may have been considerably less binding on private firms that are
still subject to federal law.
The Proposition 209 experiment
Not only does it seem reasonable to expect that this change in policy would have an
impact on California labor markets, but it also provides an opportunity to address
two shortcomings of the empirical evidence to date.
First, previous work has had to rely on the comparison of firms that participate
in affirmative action to those that do not. Researchers have either used EEOC data
3This average is from the employment data used in this chapter.
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to compare federal contractors to non-contractors or firm-level data to compare
firms that report using affirmative action to those that do not. Yet, because firms
self-select into using affirmative action (by choosing to be federal contractors or
by voluntarily implementing programs of their own), estimates of the impact of
affirmative action may be biased downward. Federal contractors and voluntary
participants may self-select precisely because it is relatively cheap to implement
affirmative action. Moreover, the results of these studies have only provided an
indication of the firm or sector-level impact of affirmative action, not of its economy-
wide impacts. For instance, it is known that minority employment was rising at both
contracting and non-contracting firms that file EEO-1 reports (albeit more rapidly
at the contracting firms), but what was happening at firms that do not have to
provide data on their composition? Did this rise in employment mask a re-shuffling
of minorities between sectors?
Second, there has been no previous opportunity to gauge the impact of removing
affirmative action— only of implementing it. While we do not suffer from a shortage
of theoretical models of affirmative action, there is comparatively scant evidence on
its long-term consequences. Theoretically, any model of a binding and effective
affirmative action program will predict that minority employment should rise while
the policy is in place, leaving only the need to see empirically whether existing
programs appear to be effective and what the extent of their impact is.
Depending on the assumptions made about the source of pre-existing inequality,
affirmative action may or may not engender a long-term change in labor market
differentials that would remain even if the program were removed. If labor market
discrimination did not exist in the first place or if, as some models (e.g., Johnson
and Welch, 1976) suggest, affirmative action is not an efficient policy, then removing
affirmative action may cause the labor market to revert to its competitive equilib-
rium. On the other hand, certain models of discrimination do suggest a long-term
impact for affirmative action. If, for example, labor market inequalities are the re-
sult of classic employer discrimination, then it is possible that by being forced to
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interact with minority groups, employer prejudices will diminish so that once af-
firmative action is removed there is no longer inequality. Alternatively, Coate and
Loury (1993) consider a form of statistical discrimination in which employers are less
likely to place minority workers in high skilled jobs because of negative stereotypes.
As a result, minorities have less incentive to invest in human capital, leading to a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Assuming that minority workers have the same fundamental
ability, affirmative action could break this cycle and potentially create permanent
change in negative stereotypes. A third theoretical alternative for predicting the
continued effectiveness of affirmative action after its removal is that presented by
Athey et al. (2000). In their model, entry level employees receive more mentoring
from senior employees with similar characteristics. As a result, there is bias towards
one type of employee in promotion that can be permanently broken by a temporary
affirmative action program that introduces diversity.
The passage of Proposition 209 provides a natural experiment that can be used
to address both shortcomings of previous studies. First, it provides a (presumably)
exogenous shock to affirmative action policy that affects only workers in California,
leaving workers in the rest of the country as a control group. Second, this is the first
legislation that has attempted to dismantle affirmative action.4 By comparing the
relative change in labor market outcomes in California to the rest of the country, we
can see what impact removing state-sponsored affirmative action had on women and
minorities in California. If there was no impact, it could be the case that affirmative
action was either ineffective in the first place in California or that it was effective in
engendering long-term changes that remained even after its removal. If there was
a negative impact on the employment of minorities, this suggests that either the
prejudicial attitudes of employers were not changed under California’s affirmative
action program or that the program itself had engendered inefficiencies and reverse
discrimination against whites.
4Other states and political entities followed suit after the proposal of Proposition 209. Washing-




I employ data from the outgoing rotation groups in the monthly Current Populaton
Survey (CPS) from 1994-2001, placing emphasis on 1995, the year before the pro-
posal of Proposition 209, and 1999, two years after the new law had gone into effect.
Observations are dropped if an individual is employed but reports no hours or pay,
reports unknown sector of employment, or is self-employed.5 Observations from
Washington state were also dropped because that state passed legislation similar to
Proposition 209 in 1998.
The triple difference estimates in this analysis will rely on three divisions of
the data. First, the observations are categorized as before or after the enactment
of proposition 209 (e.g. 1995 or 1999, 1995 or 2000, and so on depending on the
years being used). Second, individuals are divided into eight mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive categories: white males, white females, black males, black
females, other males, other females, Hispanic males, and Hispanic females. And
third, the country is divided into two groups: an experimental state (California)
and and the remaining control states or “nation.”
Table 4.1 reports sample sizes for each cell. Because of its population, the sample
sizes within California for even this detailed breakdown of minority groups are still
fairly large. However, California is not necessarily representative of the country as
a whole. It is more minority heavy than the rest of the country and has slightly
lower rates of employment, but a similar distribution of employment across sectors
and industry. The fact that California is more diverse than the country as a whole
means that extrapolations from its experience with affirmative action to general
predictions should be made cautiously.
Labor Force Status Averages
Turning to the effects of affirmative action, Table 4.2 explores the change in non-
5Because men are more likely than women to be self-employed, omitting this group tends to
increase the number of women in the sample relative to the number of men
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Table 4.1: Sample Sizes
1995 1999
Nation California Nation California
white male 94, 335 5, 113 84, 120 5, 191
white female 112, 672 6, 045 98, 649 5, 927
black male 11, 582 595 10, 238 597
black female 16, 689 773 14, 409 812
hispanic male 7, 301 2, 805 8, 315 2, 992
hispanic female 8, 533 3, 144 8, 991 3, 168
other male 4, 857 1, 310 4, 431 1, 246
other female 5, 758 1, 500 5, 198 1, 486
total 261, 727 21, 285 234, 351 21, 419
participation in the labor force for white females after Proposition 209 was enacted.
In 1995, 46.0 percent of California women over age 16 were not in the labor force
while 32.1 percent of males were not participating. In 1999, after Proposition 209
had gone into effect, the percentage of white females who were not in the labor force
had fallen to 44.5 percent, but the participation of men showed a similar change.
Overall, there was no significant change in the participation of white women relative
to that of white men in California. As a control, I look at the same outcomes for the
rest of the nation. Over the same period nationwide, the non-participation of white
women had fallen by 1.3 percentage points relative to white men. Differencing these
effects, relative to the rest of the country, non-participation among white females in
California rose by 1.6 more percentage points than that for white males. However,
this estimate is not significant.
In addition to women, racial minority groups in California may have also been
affected by Proposition 209. Table 4.3 presents the triple difference average changes
in hourly wages as well as in the three labor force categories into which each indi-
vidual falls: employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force. For each group, the
triple difference is calculated as in the preceding example. Note in particular that
because employment, unemployment, and non-participation are mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive, the relative changes for each group across these cate-
gories sum to 0. The averages indicate that, relative to white males and the rest of
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Table 4.2: Change in Non-Participation: White Males and Females
Time
Difference
1995 1999 for Group
California
white females 0.460 0.445 -0.015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
white males 0.321 0.302 -0.018
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009)





white females 0.432 0.421 -0.012
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
white males 0.284 0.285 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)






*Standard errors are in parentheses below estimates. All differences in
bold are significant at the 10% level. Rounding is done after calcula-
tions.
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Table 4.3: Triple Differences Summary
Not in Hourly
Employed Unemployed Labor Force Wage
white males - - - -
white females -0.021 0.005 0.016 0.761
black males -0.054 0.008 0.047 -0.240
black females -0.034 -0.019 0.053 0.256
hispanic males -0.002 -0.010 0.012 0.185
hispanic females -0.029 -0.004 0.033 0.504
other males -0.060 0.003 0.057 0.028
other females -0.016 0.002 0.014 0.765
*Values in bold are significant at the 10% level. All monetary values are in
1995 dollars.
the nation, the proportion of black males, Hispanic females, and other males who
were employed fell in California. There was no significant change in unemployment,
but non-participation rose for black females and other males. Among five of the
seven groups, the observed drop in employment is mirrored by a corresponding rise
in non-participation. However, for black females and Hispanic males, a relatively
larger portion appear to leave employment and move to unemployment. While the
estimates find no significant change in wages, the point estimates are positive for six
of the seven groups suggesting, for example, that the relative wage of white females
rose by 76 cents. However, there is no clear prediction about the wage changes that
might accompany a policy that can directly affect both wages and participation. It
may be the case that the employees who are left are relatively more skilled, so aver-
age wages might rise. Alternatively, it might be the case that affirmative action also
served to augment wage equality and so its removal might create a drop in wages.
Given the possibility of opposing effects, if is not surprising to find no significant
impact on wages.
Individual-specific differences
Although it is primarily viewed as a cross-sectional data set, the CPS can also be
used as a panel in which each individual in the outgoing rotation group is observed
twice. The CPS is constructed by interviewing the residents of a particular address
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for four months, dropping them from the sample, and then interviewing them again
for four months one calendar year later. Hence, individual i first appears in the
outgoing rotation group during his fourth month in the CPS sample. He then leaves
the sample and re-enters one year later where he again appears in the outgoing
rotation group in his eighth month in the sample. However, if an individual moves,
it is the address that is followed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and not the
individual. To construct a panel, I match the respondents at a particular address
across year and then assume that the respondent is the same person if sex and race
have not changed and if age has increased by 0 to 2 years. This allows approximately
two thirds of the individuals in the outgoing rotation group in any given year to be
matched to the previous year. However, because of a change in CPS methodology,
matching is not possible for June-December of 1994 and 1995 and January-August
of 1995 and 1996.
If Proposition 209 had an effect on the labor force status of women and minori-
ties, then one would expect to find differences in the status of individuals across
years. Moreover, by examining the change in outcome for the same individual, in-
dividual specific fixed effects (such as ability or skill) are eliminated. I examine the
probability that an individual left the labor force between t = 1 and t = 2 given an
observed change in labor force status. Thus, the first difference in non-participation
for any individual is 1 if he left the labor force and 0 if he entered the labor force.
Conditioning on a change in labor force status reduces the sample size, but creates
a binary variable for the first difference, assisting with inference for the double and
triple differences.6
Table 4.4 reports the triple difference estimates of the relative probability that
members of each minority group left the labor force given a change in participa-
6Consider, for instance, the difference for an individual in non-participation. It could be 1
(left labor force), 0 (no change), or −1 (entered labor force) and so is not binomially or normally
distributed. Because of small sample sizes, it does not seem reasonable to invoke the Central Limit
Theorem and non-parametric tests of differences for matched pairs are not appropriate for double
or triple differences. By looking at whether an individual entered or left the labor force conditional
on a change in participation, I create a binomial random variable and avoid these issues.
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Table 4.4: Triple differences for proportion of each group that left the
labor force conditional on a change in participation
93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99
white males - - - - - -
white females 0.015 0.167 0.155 0.017 -0.007 0.038
black males -0.039 0.477 0.251 0.010 0.019 -0.013
black females -0.156 0.289 0.318 -0.061 0.052 0.075
hispanic males -0.017 0.177 -0.072 -0.018 -0.041 -0.033
hispanic females -0.036 0.186 0.235 -0.009 -0.010 -0.040
other males 0.015 0.068 0.100 0.046 -0.127 0.006
other females -0.054 0.155 -0.276 0.048 -0.022 -0.032
all minorities -0.038 0.157 0.116 -0.008 -0.034 -0.022
*Values in bold are significant at the 10% level.
tion. The first difference is the proportion of each group that left the labor force
conditional on a change in participation. The second difference gives the proportion
of each minority group that left the labor force relative to the proportion of white
males. The third difference compares this change in California to the change in
the rest of the nation. The estimates indicate that significant changes took place
between 1994 and 1995 and 1995 and 1996.7 Between 1994 and 1995 in California,
white women were 16.7 percent more likely to have left the labor force given a change
in participation than were white men relative to the nation as a whole. Black males,
black females, and Hispanic females were also more likely to leave the labor force
than to enter to it. Between 1995 and 1996, black women and Hispanic women were
again more likely to leave the labor force than to enter it although the reverse is
true for other females. As a whole, the estimates suggest a significant climb in the
proportion of minorities who were leaving the labor force relative to entering it in
the mid-nineties.
Note that the years for which these changes are observed are directly preceding
or during the period when Proposition 209 was debated and passed. This could
indicate an anticipation of the change in affirmative action policy, which seems
plausible given the political environment in California at the time. While these
7These are the same years for which limited matching was possible due to change in CPS
methodology. The significant estimates are noteworthy given the small sample sizes
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results are indicative of significant change, they cannot be compared directly to
estimates in upcoming sections which are based on cross sectional cuts of the data.
In particular, the outcome variable in the regressions will not be conditioned on
a change in participation and the span of time examined is longer than one year.
However, these findings do bolster later results suggesting a significant change in
participation.
4.4 Econometric model
To control further for the characteristics of the potential or actual labor force in
estimating the impacts of Proposition 209, I turn to a triple difference regression
framework. Suppose that there are only two racial/ethnic/gender groups: white
males (wm) and white females (wf). In the case of general outcome y, consider the
equation
yijt = xijtγ + β1yeart + β2calij + β3wfi + β4(yeart ∗ calij)+
β5(yeart ∗ wfi) + β6(calij ∗ wfi) + β7(yeart ∗ calij ∗ wfi) + εijt (4.1)
where xijt is a vector containing a constant and explanatory variables other than
those that are part of the differencing, i indexes an individual, j indexes location,
and t indexes time. In this case, year is a dummy for the latter year in the regression
(e.g. 1999 if we are comparing 1999 to 1994), cali is a dummy indicating that the
individual resides in California, and wf , again, indicates that the individual is a
white woman. The coefficient β7 represents the triple difference estimate of the
impact of Proposition 209 on outcome y for white women. This framework is used
to estimate the impact of Proposition 209 on employment, unemployment, labor
force participation, and ln(wages).
The first three outcomes are binary variables and are commonly estimated with
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probit or logit models. However, as Ai and Norton (2003) point out, the marginal
effect of the interacted variables in a probit or logit model is not the same thing as
the marginal effect of the interaction term. In previous studies, the triple difference
marginal effect in a probit model has been estimated via some variant of the following
calculation:
Δ3 = Φ(x̄γ̂ + β̂7) − Φ(x̄γ̂) (4.2)
.
However, this estimation ignores the fact that one cannot simultaneously “turn off”
β7 without affecting the other related interaction variables. In short, there is little
intuitive explanation for what this particular calculation might mean.
In this case, to calculate the triple difference marginal effect one would need to
calculate the double differences as follows:
Δ2cali =
[Φ(x̄γ̂ + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 + β6 + β7) − Φ(x̄γ̂ + β2 + β3 + β6)] −
[Φ(x̄γ̂ + β1 + β2 + β4) − Φ(x̄γ̂ + β2)] (4.3)
Δ2nation =
[Φ(x̄γ̂ + β1 + β3 + β5) − Φ(x̄γ̂ + β3)] − [Φ(x̄γ̂ + β1) − Φ(x̄γ̂)]. (4.4)
and then calculate the triple difference by
Δ3 = Δ2cali − Δ2nation. (4.5)
In addition to needing to calculate the marginal effects in this way, the standard
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errors of these estimates are difficult to obtain. Ai and Norton (2003) point out
that simply because the estimated probit coefficient on the triple difference term is
significant does not mean that the marginal effect is.
To avoid these serious complications in estimating, interpreting, and conducting
inference for the triple difference marginal effects, I turn instead to a linear prob-
ability model. The advantages of using such a model are that the triple difference
effects can be easily estimated (it is, as in the original simple exposition, β7, the
coefficient on the triple interaction term) and standard errors can be calculated.
Linear probability models are oft-criticized on three basic grounds: non-normality
of the disturbances, heteroskedastic variance of the disturbances, and the fact that
the predicted probabilities are not restricted to the interval [0, 1]. However, in this
case, the large sample size negates the importance of the first consideration, it is
possible to correct for the heteroskedasticity, and, only a small portion of the pre-
dicted values lie outside of the [0,1] range.8 Therefore, I use a linear probability
model with robust standard errors. However, as noted in the following section, the
point estimates of the marginal effects, when calculated as in Equation (8), are very
similar to those obtained with a Probit model.
Turning to the final labor market outcome of interest, I estimate a log wage
regression to gauge the impact of removing affirmative action on hourly wages.
Because no likely instrument is present for estimating a two-stage Heckman-type
procedure, this is simply a wage regression conditional on employment. The possible
biases that this may present are discussed along with the results in the following
section.
8For most specifications, fewer than 5 percent of predicted probabilities were outside of the [0, 1]
range. However, these particular predicted values do create a problem for the FGLS procedure
since the weight used is the estimated variance of the error term (p̂(1 − p̂)) which will often be
negative if predicted probabilities are less than 0 or greater than 1. To avoid this issue, standard
errors were corrected with the Huber-White method. The robust results are very similar to those
obtained with FGLS after censoring the predicted values.
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4.5 Empirical analysis of Proposition 209
Labor force status
Table 4.5 reports the triple difference coefficients for linear probability models of
employment, unemployment, and non-participation. The changes in employment,
unemployment, and non-participation for any one group must sum to 0, but all
three results are presented for ease of analysis.9 In an attempt to identify possible
short and longer term effects of the legislation, four pairs of years are examined:
1995 and 1998, 1995 and 1999, 1995 and 2000, and 1995 and 2001.10 Moreover, the
results are presented for each of the seven “minority” categories as well as for all of
the minorities together to give an average effect.
Between 1995 and 1998, the relative employment of white females declined by 2.0
percentage points and that for other males declined by 5.7 percentage points. Most
of the decline appears to be accounted for by a similar rise in non-participation.
Hispanic males, on the other hand, seem to have moved from being less likely to be
employed to more likely to be unemployed. In later years, however, the trend for
all minority groups appears to have been a move out of employment and into non-
participation. Between 1995 and 1999, the relative employment of minorities fell by
2.1 percentage points while non-participation rose by 2.3 percentage points. Between
1995 and 2000, relative employment fell by 1.4 percentage points (but the change
is not significant) and non-participation rose by 1.8 percentage points. Breaking
this down by group, between 1995 and 2000, relative non-participation rose by
1.8 percentage points for white females, 8.4 percentage points for black females, 2.5
percentage points for Hispanic males, 3.1 percentage points for Hispanic females, and
9In addition to race and sex, age, marital status, interview month, education, region, urban
status, citizenship, and nativity were also controlled for in all regressions. Wage regressions also
included indicators of sector of employment (public, private, or federal), occupation, and industry.
The appendix contains a complete list of the differencing coefficients for the 1995-1999 regressions.
10In all cases, 1995 is used as the base year to which post-legislation years are compared. The
results are similar if 1993, 1994, or 1996 is used as the base instead. In addition, 2002-2003 were
also examined as post-legislation years. The triple difference coefficients are similar in 2002 but
become insignificant in 2003. However, it is not clear how to interpret this since extending the time
frame also increases the chance of unobserved events biasing the results.
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Table 4.5: Triple Difference Coefficients for Employment, Unemployment,
and Non-Participation LPMs
1995-1998 1995-1999 1995-2000 1995-2001
coef se coef se coef se coef se
Employment
white females -0.020 0.011 -0.031 0.011 -0.018 0.011 -0.024 0.011
black males 0.017 0.026 -0.041 0.026 -0.018 0.026 0.024 0.026
black females -0.020 0.024 -0.030 0.024 -0.058 0.024 -0.056 0.024
hispanic males -0.013 0.015 -0.001 0.014 -0.023 0.014 -0.025 0.015
hispanic females -0.008 0.016 -0.034 0.016 -0.035 0.015 -0.021 0.015
other males -0.057 0.020 -0.065 0.020 -0.047 0.019 -0.070 0.019
other females -0.005 0.020 -0.020 0.020 -0.022 0.020 -0.027 0.020
all minorities -0.010 0.009 -0.021 0.009 -0.014 0.009 -0.016 0.009
Unemployment
white females 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.005
black males -0.009 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.000 0.015
black females -0.005 0.013 -0.018 0.012 -0.026 0.012 -0.000 0.013
hispanic males 0.015 0.009 -0.009 0.008 -0.002 0.008 -0.001 0.008
hispanic females 0.011 0.008 -0.004 0.007 0.004 0.007 -0.004 0.007
other males 0.013 0.010 0.005 0.010 -0.011 0.009 0.008 0.010
other females -0.003 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.008
all minorities 0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005
Non-participation
white females 0.016 0.011 0.026 0.011 0.018 0.011 0.020 0.011
black males -0.009 0.024 0.032 0.025 0.005 0.025 -0.025 0.024
black females 0.025 0.023 0.048 0.024 0.084 0.024 0.057 0.024
hispanic males -0.002 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.025 0.013 0.026 0.013
hispanic females -0.003 0.015 0.038 0.015 0.031 0.015 0.025 0.015
other males 0.044 0.019 0.060 0.019 0.058 0.019 0.061 0.018
other females 0.009 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.019
all minorities 0.005 0.009 0.023 0.009 0.018 0.009 0.016 0.009
*Standard errors are robust. Values in bold are significant at the 10% level.
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Table 4.6: Triple Difference Coefficients for Log(Wage) Regressions
1995-1998 1995-1999 1995-2000 1995-2001
coef se coef se coef se coef se
white females 0.017 0.018 0.001 0.018 -0.014 0.019 -0.003 0.020
black males -0.017 0.040 -0.039 0.039 -0.092 0.040 -0.005 0.040
black females -0.017 0.037 -0.029 0.040 -0.029 0.037 -0.100 0.041
hispanic males 0.012 0.021 0.007 0.021 0.005 0.021 -0.019 0.021
hispanic females 0.026 0.024 0.052 0.024 0.044 0.023 0.037 0.025
other males -0.028 0.032 -0.016 0.033 0.044 0.031 0.009 0.033
other females 0.000 0.031 0.041 0.030 0.087 0.029 0.019 0.032
all minorities 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.015 0.008 0.015 -0.002 0.016
*Standard errors are robust. Values in bold are significant at the 10% level. All monetary
values are 1995 dollars.
5.8 percentage points for other males. This increase in non-participation accounts
for nearly all of the decline in employment for all groups except black females, who
also saw a drop in unemployment as they moved out of the labor force. Only black
males and other females do not exhibit significant changes in labor force status.
This trend continues through to 2001, when the relative employment of minorities
fell by 1.6 percentage points with an equal rise in non-participation.
As a whole, the results suggest that the impact of Proposition 209 was to move
females and minorities from employment to out of the labor force. If, as the results
indicate, the removal of affirmative action made it more difficult for women and mi-
norities to find work, then this exit from the labor force is not surprising. Previous
work has tended to indicate that women have more elastic labor supplies than men
and they tend to be more responsive along the extensive participation margin (Blau
and Kahn, 2005). In addition, when looking at the impact of minimum wage legis-
lation, Mincer (1976) finds that affected groups tend to leave the labor force and,
moreover, that females and minorities have relatively high participation elasticities.
It seems that, as in the case of other changes in the costs of working, women and
minorities responded to the removal of affirmative action by leaving the labor force.
Wages
As discussed previously, there is no clear prediction of the impact of removing af-
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firmative action on wages. Relative wage changes will depend on the nature of
pre-existing discrimination, the effectiveness of affirmative action, and the relative
skill levels of the groups affected by its removal. It is thus not surprising that the
results in Table 4.6 do not show such clear patterns as the labor force status re-
gressions. No significant changes are observed between 1995 and 1998 but in 1999
the relative wages of employed Hispanic females have risen by 5 percent. This trend
continues into 2000 and we see an additional rise for other females, but the wages for
black males have fallen by 9.2 percent. Between 1995 and 2001, only black females
show a significant change in relative wages. As a whole, the results do not show
a consistent effect for any of the groups with the possible of exception of a rise in
wages for Hispanic females. This could indicate that affirmative action had little
effect on wages. Affirmative action laws, after all, did not directly address wage
equality, which was covered by equal employment law. It could also be the result of
skill bias among those leaving employment. Since the wage regressions are condi-
tional on employment, the wages of those who remain employed could rise because
they are relatively more skilled or fall because they are relatively less skilled than
those who left.
Participation effects by age and education level
The wage findings do not provide consistent evidence of skill bias in those who
remain unemployed, but they do not prove the contrary either. Previous studies
have suggested that affirmative action helps to advance minorities into more skilled
occupations (e.g., Goldstein and Smith, 1976; Leonard, 1984b), so it might be that
it is high-skilled minorities who leave with the removal of affirmative action. In an
attempt to gauge which groups of workers are more affected by the legislation, the
non-participation regressions were estimated for separate segments of the sample.
Table 4.7 reports these results. In columns (1)-(3), non-participation regression
coefficients are reported for three education levels: less than high school, a high
school diploma, and education beyond high school. Interestingly, it is neither the
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School <30 30-50 > 50
white females 0.034 0.042 0.019 -0.012 0.041 0.034
black males -0.004 0.050 0.049 -0.071 0.102 -0.015
black females -0.002 0.097 0.036 -0.023 0.067 0.070
hispanic males -0.001 0.040 -0.019 -0.006 0.045 -0.041
hispanic females 0.015 0.075 0.046 0.009 0.078 -0.009
other males -0.043 0.041 0.110 0.092 0.079 -0.009
other females -0.053 0.072 0.032 -0.007 0.007 0.048
all minorities -0.006 0.048 0.028 -0.002 0.043 0.017
*Standard errors are robust. Values in bold are significant at the 10%
level.
lowest nor the highest education levels that are affected: it is the middle. High
school graduates who have not completed education beyond that level show the
largest and most significant decline in labor force participation. Turning to age,
columns (4)-(6) report results for three age brackets: 30 years old or younger, 30 to
50 years old, and older than 50. Again, it is the group in the middle that has both
the largest and the significant coefficients. This is especially surprising given the
expectation that very young and very old workers will be less attached to the labor
force than middle aged workers. One story that is consistent with these findings is
that, as suggested by previous work, affirmative action had little impact on unskilled
labor so that its removal had little effect for young or uneducated workers. However,
it did help to advance employment for workers with intermediate skill and tenure
levels. On the other hand, it could also be the case that education and age are poor
proxies for skill.
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Table 4.8: DDD Coefficients for Sector of Employment (1995-1999)
P(Private|Emp) P(Public |Emp) P(Federal|Emp)
coef se coef se coef se
white females -0.007 0.011 0.013 0.011 -0.006 0.005
black males -0.006 0.030 0.018 0.029 -0.012 0.020
black females -0.064 0.027 0.076 0.028 -0.012 0.016
hispanic males -0.016 0.010 0.025 0.010 -0.009 0.006
hispanic females -0.018 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.005 0.006
other males 0.024 0.017 -0.013 0.016 -0.011 0.012
other females -0.015 0.019 0.012 0.009 0.003 0.011
all minorities -0.008 0.008 0.015 0.008 -0.006 0.004
*Standard errors are robust. Values in bold are significant at the 10% level.
All monetary values are 1995 dollars.
Sector of employment
Previously I suggested that, because Proposition 209 does not supersede federal
affirmative action laws, workers in California’s public sector, who were covered by
California but not federal policy, might see the largest effects from the measure.
However, it is difficult to use CPS data to compare inter-sector differences. The
results for the economy as a whole suggest that Proposition 209 did not affect the
unemployment rate but did decrease participation. But, if an individual is not in the
labor force, then we cannot identify what sector they may have worked in previously.
I attempt to circumvent this problem by using a linear probability model to estimate
the impact of Proposition 209 on the probability that an individual works in the
private, public (state or local), or federal sector given that he is employed.
Table 4.8 presents these results. While few of the point estimates are significant,
they tend to be negative for the private and federal sectors and positive for the
public (state or local) sector. The results indicate that minorities were relatively
more likely to work in the public sector and less likely to work in the private or
federal sector after the passage of Proposition 209. This is counter to the expectation
that the negative effects of Proposition 209 would be strongest for state and local
workers in California. It may be the case that private employers did respond to
the removal of state-sponsored affirmative action in California and to the general
anti-affirmative action climate of the period. While many private-sector firms in
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California were likely to be federal contractors, federal affirmative action policy had
also been under intense legal scrutiny during the nineties and private employers in
California may have felt more bound by state policy than federal.
It is difficult, however, to draw any strong conclusions based on the evidence
about changes in employment across sector. The results presented earlier suggest
that minorities were leaving the labor force as a result of Proposition 209 and it is
not possible to identify what sector an individual may have worked in previously
if they are currently not in the labor force. Moreover, by only looking at changes
in aggregate employment probabilities, we could miss changes in skill composition
across sector.
4.6 Conclusion
The enactment of Proposition 209 in California created a unique opportunity to
study the labor market effects of the removal of affirmative action programs. Changes
in minority outcomes in California relative to those of white males are compared
to the same differences for the rest of the nation in order to separate the effects of
Proposition 209 from general trends in inequality.
The results suggest that there was a sharp drop in employment after the passage
of Proposition 209, which resulted in minorities leaving the labor force. Between
1995 and 2000, relative participation rates in California fell by 1.8 percentage points
for white females, 8.4 percentage points for black females, 3.1 percentage points
for Hispanic females, 2.5 percentage points for Hispanic males, and 5.8 percentage
points for other males. There appears to have been little corresponding change in
wages rates. While it is possible that this lack of observed change in pay is the
result of selection bias, with, for instance, unconditional wages falling but more
skilled workers remaining employed, estimates of the participation decision across
age and education groups do not indicate that either low or high skilled workers
were disparately affected by the removal of affirmative action.
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The decline in minority participation raises doubts about affirmative action pro-
grams. It is consistent with one of two hypotheses: that affirmative action is in-
efficient and creates reverse discrimination or that affirmative action is ineffective
at engendering permanent change in prejudices that create labor market inequality.
A final possibility is that California’s affirmative action programs had not been in
place long enough to engender permanent alteration in inequality. However, given





The three essays that make up this dissertation have each taken a detailed look at
how preferences, prejudice, and discrimination affect inequality in labor and housing
markets. They have provided both theoretical predictions and empirical tests and
have demonstrated that prejudicial attitudes can create differentials as readily as
direct discrimination.
The first essay, inspired by the observation that local television news personalities
are a diverse group, used a combination of Nielsen ratings and author-collected data
on the characteristics of television markets, stations, and anchor teams to examine
the determinants of the racial make-up of stations and how the characteristics of
on-air staff affect ratings. I presented a theory that combines elements of Becker’s
model of customer discrimination with a Hotelling-type model to show that, under
certain circumstances, firms will wish to differentiate along racial lines to attract
different segments of the market. The evidence from local news is consistent with
this theory. Stations respond negatively to increases in the minority composition of
their rivals. Furthermore, the viewers of stations with few blacks react negatively to
an increase in the percentage of blacks while viewers of stations with relatively more
blacks respond positively, suggesting that these stations are, in fact, differentiating
in order to cater to certain segments of the market.
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The second essay addressed a long-standing problem in empirical studies of racial
differentials in house prices. Because race and neighborhood characteristics are
strongly correlated, studies of racial housing price differentials have yielded results
that vary widely depending on the types of neighborhood controls used. This paper
incorporated two innovations to address this problem. First, I introduced data that
provide smaller and more homogenous neighborhood proxies to control for neighbor-
hood characteristics. Secondly, I took advantage of the time series characteristics of
the data to test for and deal with correlation between unobserved neighborhood and
house effects and race. I show that even with relatively thorough neighborhood con-
trols, there is still evidence that correlation between the error term and regressors
is a source of bias. While recent studies have tended to find evidence of a negative
premium for blacks, fixed effects estimates in this paper indicate that black owners
pay premiums of around 10 percent for housing. Moreover, house values decline
in neighborhoods as the percentage of blacks increases, suggesting that prejudicial
attitudes among consumers affect house prices within neighborhoods.
The third essay took advantage of a natural experiment created by California
Proposition 209, which eliminated state affirmative action programs. By using triple
difference techniques to control for state and group trends, I isolated the effect
of removing affirmative action on women and minorities. The estimates indicate
that minority labor market participation fell approximately two percentage points
with the removal of this program, suggesting that either affirmative action was not
efficient in the first place or that it had been an efficient solution to discrimination
but had not engendered long-run changes in attitudes.
As a whole, these essays highlight the importance of taking into account not
only direct discriminatory behavior, but also the more subtle forces of preference
and prejudice. In the local news market, although customers themselves are not
forcing firms to segregate, it is their preferences that drive that outcome. In housing
markets it is the prejudices of neighbors that cause house prices to fall with an influx
of blacks although these neighbors are not themselves taking money out of anybody’s
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hand. These essays also sound a cautionary note for government. Even if we could
effectively eliminate supplier discrimination in housing or employer discrimination
in labor markets, the preferences of demanders could continue to drive inequality.
Moreover, as the final chapter on affirmative action suggests, prejudice may not be
an easy thing to change.
That is not, however, meant to suggest that we should not try. All three essays
open avenues for future work to help us better understand the nature of inequality.
The first essay provided evidence of a previously unconsidered phenomenon in which
firms differentiate in response to customer discrimination. This leaves open the
question of what this means for employment and wage differentials and whether or
not such differentiation is efficient. It also does not answer the question of who the
prejudiced customers are. The second essay addressed the shortcomings of recent
empirical estimates of housing discrimination. It presented strong evidence that
housing discrimination and demander prejudice both continue to play a significant
role in housing markets. However, the data used are already a decade old. We need
more recent data to see if, as I expect, the trend continues. Moreover, because of
limited sample sizes, I assumed that the effect of changing racial composition was
symmetric so that if house prices fall as blacks move into a neighborhood, then
they rise by the same amount as blacks move out. Yet what we know about the
dynamics of neighborhoods suggests that the process of neighborhood tipping and
gentrification may be more complicated that this. Finally, the third essay leaves
open the question of what the removal of affirmative action looked liked on a more
micro level. How were firms themselves responding? What happened to profits?
While questions remain, we have come a long way in our understanding of the
issue of inequality. We know, first of all, that it exists. And the sum of our work on
the causes suggests that, in part at least, this is due to the proverbial playing field
not being level. However, inequality in opportunity is not only the result of direct
discriminatory action. My work suggests that, even without getting anywhere near
the field, the preferences and prejudices of all members of society affect outcomes.
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Just by flipping channels during the evening news, viewers affect the labor market
for local news personalities. Just by not being happy that a black family moved in
down the street, the preferences of neighbors affect housing markets. If we wish to
combat inequality, then, we need to attempt to craft policy that not only affects




A.1 Variables Used in Chapter 2
Table A.1: Variables Used in Chapter 2
Name Description min max mean
Show Characteristics
rating Nielsen rating for November 2003 0.5 17.4 5.1
share Nielsen share for November 2003 1.0 33.0 12.4
length number of quarter hours that
broadcast lasts
1 12 2.9
post network indicator that broadcast imme-
diately follows national network
news
0 1 0.19
pre network indicator that broadcast immedi-
ately precedes national network
news
0 1 0.25
weekday indicator that broadcast is on a
weekday
0 1 0.76
weekend indicator that broadcast is on a
weekend
0 1 0.24
early morn indicator that broadcast begins
between 5 a.m. and 7:59 a.m.
0 1 0.33
mid morn indicator that broadcast begins
between 8 a.m. and 10:59 a.m.
0 1 0.03
midday indicator that broadcast begins
between 11 a.m. and 4:59 p.m.
0 1 0.12
early eve indicator that broadcast begins
between 5 p.m. and 5:59 p.m.
0 1 0.29
late eve indicator that broadcast begins
between 9 p.m. and 11:59 p.m.
0 1 0.22
no. english casts number of local newscasts in




Name Description min max mean
no. spanish casts number of local newscasts in
Spanish broadcast during show’s
time slot
0 3 0.3
sport anch indicator that broadcast has a
sports anchor
0 1 0.43
minority anchor indicator that broadcast has a
minority news anchor
0 1 0.56
female anchor indicator that broadcast has a fe-
male news anchor
0 1 0.95
minority weather indicator that broadcast has a
minority weather anchor
0 1 0.10
female weather indicator that broadcast has a fe-
male weather anchor
0 1 0.24
minority sports indicator that broadcast has a
minority sports anchor
0 1 0.68




dma rank market rank by size, 1 being
largest
1 25 -
north indicator that dma is in the north 0 1 0.21
south indicator that dma is in the south 0 1 0.35
west indicator that dma is in the west 0 1 0.27
midwest indicator that dma is in the mid-
west
0 1 0.17
dma pctblack percent of persons in market who
are black
2.2 25.7 12.4
dma pcthispanic percent of persons in market who
are hispanic
0.8 42.4 13.8
dma pctasian percent of persons in MSA who
are asian
1.1 19.4 4.8
dma pctfemale percent of persons in market who
are female
50.2 53.2 51.9
dma pctyoung percent of persons in market aged
2-17
19.4 26.1 23.1
dma pctprime percent of persons in market aged
18-49
40.7 50.8 47.1
english stations number of stations that broad-
cast local news in English
4 9 6.2
spanish stations number of stations that broad-
cast local news in Spanish
0 5 1.0
24hr stations indicator that there is a 24-hour
local news channel in market
0 1 0.3
Station Characteristics




Name Description min max mean
ABC indicator that station is ABC af-
filiate
0 1 0.24
CBS indicator that station is CBS af-
filiate
0 1 0.26
FOX indicator that station is FOX af-
filiate
0 1 0.22
no. persons number of on-air employees 11 45 29.2
age average age of on-air staff 33.4 48.8 41.5
pctnative percent of on-air staff that is area
native
0 56.6 25.0
pcthighed percent of on-air staff with educa-
tion beyond a bachelor’s degree
0 39.1 11.7
tenure average staff tenure at station, in
years
2 15.4 8.3
experience average staff experience in local
television news, in years
3.0 27.0 17.6
no. stations average number of stations on-air
staff have worked at
2.6 4.7 3.6
pct emmys percent of regional emmys for lo-
cal news awarded to station
0 84.6 26.3
pctwhite percent of on-air staff that is
white
54.3 100.0 74.2
pctblack percent of on-air staff that is
black
0.0 38.1 15.0
pcthispanic percent of on-air staff that is His-
panic
0.0 28.6 5.9
pctasian percent of on-air staff that is
asian or other(2 of the 125 obser-
vations are “other”)
0.0 20.0 4.8
pctfemale percent of on-air staff that is fe-
male
20.0 57.1 41.8
pctblond percent of on-air staff that is
blond
0.0 36.8 15.2
black match pctblack/dmapctblack 0 322.3 132.0
hispanic match pcthispanic/dmapcthispanic 0 193.0 37.3
asian match pctasian/dmapctasian 0.0 584.1 113.2
female match pctfemale/dmapctfemale 39.3 110.0 80.5
min manager indicator that station manager
and/or news director is a minor-
ity
0.0 1 0.22
female manager indicator that station manager
and/or news director is female
0.0 1 0.38
other stat pctblack average pctblack for other sta-
tions in DMA
3.1 31.2 15.0




Name Description min max mean
otherstat pctasian average pctasian for other sta-
tions in DMA
0.0 17.7 4.8
other stat pctfemale average pctfemalefor other sta-
tion in DMA
30.4 51.5 41.8
other stat age average agefor other station in
DMA
34.8 46.5 41.5
*Note that the means for the station characteristics weight each station evenly
and the means for the market characteristics weight each market evenly.
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A.2 Properties of the Racial Composition Estimator in
Chapter 2
Consider the case in which each market has two competing stations, indexed 1 and
2. The racial composition of each, denoted y, can be modeled as a system of linear
equations:
y1 = y2α + ε1 (A.1)
y2 = y1α + ε2. (A.2)
In this case the reduced form equations are:
y1 =
α
(1 − α2)ε2 +
1
(1 − α2)ε1 (A.3)
y2 =
α
(1 − α2)ε1 +
1
(1 − α2)ε2. (A.4)
In terms of station 1, the estimator α̂ is:








can be shown that
α̂ = α +
(1 − α2)(α + ρ)
1 + α2 + 2αρ
=
2α + ρ + ρα2
1 + α2 + 2αρ
. (A.6)
Any unobserved market factors that influence station composition should influ-
ence both stations similarly. So, ρ is expected to be positive. Given ρ ≥ 0, it is clear
that, if α ≥ 0, then α̂ ≥ 0. In other words, although the estimate of α will be biased
and inconsistent, the estimate is not expected to be negative unless the true value
is negative. Moreover, under the null hypothesis that α = 0, plim(α̂) = ρ. Under
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the null, the critical value for a test of the alternative that α < 0 will be lower than
necessary. So, the probability for rejection of a negative coefficient is not overstated.
This result, however, does not extend to the case of more than two firms. If there
are three firms in a market, then the racial composition of each can be modeled as:
y1 = ȳ23α + ε1 (A.7)
y2 = ȳ13α + ε2 (A.8)
y3 = ȳ12α + ε3 (A.9)
where the racial composition of each station depends on the average composition of
competing stations. In this case, the reduced form equation for station i is:
yi =
1
4 − 3α2 − α3 [(4 − α
2)εi + α(2 + α)(εj + εk)]. (A.10)
Again assume symmetry so that V ar(ε1) = V ar(ε2) = V ar(ε3) = σ2 and Cov(ε1, ε2) =
Cov(ε2, ε3) = Cov(ε1, ε3) and let ρ be the correlation coefficient for the error terms
across stations within the same market. Then




(4 − 3α2 − α3)(α + 2ρ)
(2 + α)[(2 + α2) + 2ρ(1 + 2α)]
. (A.11)
Under the null that α = 0, E[α̂] = 2ρ1+ρ is positive as in the case of two firms. If
random effects estimates eliminate the correlation, then the estimator is consistent





So if the correlation can be eliminated, the estimator is consistent under the null
and the estimated coefficient is expected to be of the correct sign as long as |α| ≤ 4.
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A.3 Variables Used in Chapter 3
Table A.2: Variables Used in Chapter 3
Name Description
Dependent Variables
value owner-estimated fair market value of property
rent monthly contract rent
Characteristics of Unit
rooms number of rooms in unit
roomssq squared number of rooms in unit
baths number of baths in unit
half baths number of half bathrooms in unit
porch indicator of presence of porch or deck
garage indicator of presence of garage or covered parking
ac indicator that unit has central air or window units
central heat indicator that unit has central heat
built 970- indicator that unit was built in 1970 or later
built 1940-1969 indicator that unit was built between 1940 and 1969
built -1939 indicator that unit was built before 1940
Characteristics of Neighborhood
mbcrime percent of units in neighborhood reporting presence of
bothersome crime
maban percent of houses in neighborhood for which enumerator
observed one or more abandoned buildings nearby
mproblems percent of houses in neighborhood reporting that some-
thing about neighborhood is bothersome
mbar percent of houses in neighborhood for which enumerator
observed bars on the windows of nearby buildings
lmedzinc natural logarithm of median income in neighborhood
mededuc median number of years of education in neighborhood
Location and Year Dummies
central city indicator that unit is in the central city of an MSA
north indicator that unit is in north
midwes indicator that unit is in south
west indicator that unit is in west
south indicator that unit is in south
y85 indicator that observation made in 1985
y89 indicator that observation made in 1989
y93 indicator that observation made in 1993
Characteristics of Household
age age of reference person
persons number of people living in unit
married indicator that reference person is married
female indicator that reference person is female




educ2 indicator that highest grade attained by reference person
is 11 or 12
educ3 indicator that highest grade attained by reference person
is college
educ4 indicator that reference person has schooling beyond col-
lege
ln(income) natural logarithm of total income of family members living
in unit
Racial Variables
white indicator that reference person is white
black indicator that reference person is black
other indicator that reference person is of other race
whood indicator for white neighborhood (≥85 percent white or
other)
bhood indicator for black neighborhood (≥30 percent black)
inthood indicator for integrated neighborhood (between 15 and 30
percent black)
pctwhite percent of units in neighborhood with white reference per-
son
pctblack percent of units in neighborhood with black reference per-
son





Variables that appear only in regressions on value
house indicator that unit is not a mobile home
new owner indicator that owner bought home in last 5 years
Variables that appear only in regressions on rent
one unit indicator that building has 1 unit
2-3 units indicator that building has2-3 units
4- units indicator that building has more than 4 units
moved1 indicator that renter moved within last 12 months
moved12 indicator that renter moved 1-2 years ago
public housing indicator that rental unit is public housing
subsidized housing indicator that renter receives federal, state, or local rent
subsidy
rent control indicator that unit is subject to rent control
rent adjusted indicator that rent is adjusted because renter works for or
is related to owner
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A.4 1995-1999 Difference Coefficients From Chapter 4
Table A.3: 1995-1999 Difference Coefficients From Chapter
4
Employed Unemployed Participation
coef se coef se coef se
cali -0.060 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.054 0.006
y99 0.004 0.002 -0.007 0.001 0.003 0.002
wf -0.106 0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.114 0.002
bm -0.085 0.004 0.027 0.002 0.058 0.004
bf -0.152 0.004 0.015 0.002 0.136 0.004
hm 0.029 0.005 0.020 0.003 -0.049 0.005
hf -0.196 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.193 0.005
om -0.079 0.006 0.015 0.003 0.064 0.006
of -0.182 0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.187 0.006
y99*cali 0.027 0.008 -0.008 0.004 -0.019 0.007
wf*cali 0.022 0.008 -0.005 0.004 -0.017 0.007
bm*cali -0.011 0.019 -0.004 0.012 0.015 0.017
bf*cali 0.008 0.018 0.003 0.010 -0.011 0.017
hm*cali 0.061 0.011 -0.003 0.007 -0.058 0.010
hf*cali 0.043 0.011 -0.003 0.006 -0.040 0.011
om*cali 0.054 0.014 -0.012 0.008 -0.041 0.013
of*cali 0.022 0.014 -0.014 0.006 -0.008 0.014
wf*y99 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.009 0.002
bm*y99 0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.003 0.001 0.006
bf*y99 0.044 0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.041 0.005
hm*y99 0.024 0.007 -0.012 0.004 -0.012 0.006
hf*y99 0.038 0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.042 0.007
om*y99 0.018 0.009 -0.005 0.005 -0.014 0.008
of*y99 0.014 0.009 0.002 0.003 -0.016 0.009
y99*cali*wf -0.031 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.026 0.011
y99*cali*bm -0.041 0.026 0.009 0.015 0.032 0.025
y99*cali*bf -0.030 0.024 -0.018 0.012 0.048 0.024
y99*cali*hm -0.001 0.014 -0.009 0.008 0.010 0.013
y99*cali*hf -0.034 0.016 -0.004 0.007 0.038 0.015
y99*cali*om -0.065 0.020 0.005 0.010 0.060 0.019
y99*cali*of -0.020 0.020 0.002 0.008 0.018 0.020
*Standard errors are robust. Values in bold are significant at 10% level.
**The regressions also included the following explanatory variables:
age, age2, education dummies, interview month dummies, region dum-
mies, urbanarea, and dummies for citizenship and native status.
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